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Samenvatting
Deze studie geefì een overzicht van veranderingen in het socialezekerlteidsstelsel  en het actief
arbeidsmarktbeleid in Nederland in de periode 1987-1995. Daartoe worden achtereenvolgens de
beleidsdoelstellingen, -maatregelen en -evaluaties van deze veranderingen besproken. Ook worden
nog bestaande problemen geïnventariseerd en nieuwe maatregelen aangedragen. Drie verschillende
benaderingen worden daarbij onderscheiden: de stelselherziening van 1987, de herijking van de
verantwoordelijksheidsverdeling  en de combinatie met actief arbeidsmarktbeleid. Deze strategieën
vtdlen  elkaar aan omdat zij gezamenlijk bijdragen aan de toekomstige betaalbaarlreid  van de
sociale zekerheid en de jìnanciële  prikkels op de arbeidsmarkt vergroten.
Abstract
The object of tltis study is to review Dutch txperiences  in reforming social insurancc schemes and
implementing active labour market policy in the pcriod 1987-1995. This  paper specifically aims at
discussing  tlte  objectives  of tlre reforms, describing the measures acttrally implemented,  summariz-
ing  txisting  evalttations of tlre impact of the reforms and Itigltligltting  remaining problems witlt  tlte
status quo and tlte  flrrther reforms tltat  may  be necessary. Tlte  study distinguisltes  thee major
policy approaclies  as to reform social insirrance,  respectively renovaling the social sewrily system
(the  1987 system reform), reforming the organisational strtrcture of social insurance, and rencwirzg
active labour market polities  (integrating benejìt-awarding  agencies and public employment
services). These meastrres can  been seen as complenrentary  as tltey are elements of an overall
policy to safeguard the future viability of social sectrrity  and to improve labour market incentives.
Tltis  review forms part of a comparative  study by the lnternational  Labotrr Office tlrat  cncompasses
France, tke United Kingdom,  Australia and tlte  Netherlands.
* March  1996, Applied Labour Economics Research Team, Vrije Universiteit. Amsterdam. The Nethcrlands.  This
research prqject  of the International Labour Office (ILO) bas  been carried  oul  under supervision of Frank den Butler. The
author would like 10  thank  Dennis  Snower for his commcnts on an earlicr vcrsion and acknowledges  the financial  support
hy the 11.0.
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Clzapter  I Labour participation and social security
Today’s economie  policy debate in thc Nctherlands  focuses  on thc low  labour participation and
high costs  of social sccurity. In its coalition agrecmcnt, thc currcnt cabinct has proclaimed the
shortage of cmployment to bc the kcy problem of thc Dutch cconomy. Despite rapid job crcation
in thc past dccadc, largc parts of thc  labour force continuc to bc  non-cmployahle. This is mainly
dut  to thc fast growth of labour supply. Until rcccntly  thc growth of the Dutch labour force has
been curbed by earmarking great numbers of workers as ‘non-cmployable’, i.e., persons who
could not be employcd at present economie  conditions have casily been absorbcd by gencrous and
lcnient  sickness, disability, unempioymcnt  and early retircment schemcs.’ The increase of labour
supply can now largely  bc  explained by thrce developmcnts: sustaincd large numbers of womcn
enter the labour market,’ substantial parts of thc immigrant population join  the labour force, and
former disability heneficiaries re-entry to labour market activity. With regard to the latter
tendency, this is the indirect and combincd rcsult of complcmcntary policy measures, such as
constricted eligibility conditions, cuts in bencfit lcvels and durations and re-examination of
disability bcneficiaries.
Compared to othcr dcveloped countries, Dutch labour participation is indeed low. Table  1.1
summarizes some kcy OECD figures  on participation rates  for scveral European countries. In this
intcr-country comparison, participation in the Nethcrlands sce,ms rather  low, especially considcring
that the OECD definition mcasures labour participation in pcrsons  instead of full-time equivalents.
However,  working part-time is a widespread phenomenon in the Netherlands, wel1 above the EU
Tahk  1.1 Labour force participation rates  in selected  European countries 1980-1994
Belgium 63.0 62.0 62.6 64.0
Denmark 79.2 81.9 81.9 80.9
France 68.4 66.4 66.6 67.3
Germany 68.3 67.4 69.1 69.1
Italy 60.3 59.1 61.3 58.8
Ireland 63.2 62.2 62.3 64.0
Netherlands 57.7 56.0 58.2 60.7
Sweden 80.8 81.6 83.0 76.4
United Kingdom 74.0 74.4 76.7 74.3
1980 1985 1990 1994
Sorrrce:  OECD (1995). The OECD definition  of labour participation measurcs the labour force  divided hy the total
working-age  population, normally  restricted to individuals of 16-64  years old.
[! J  The concept of ‘non-employability’  derives from the starting-point  that these categories  are very  similar from an
economie  point of view. Van der Praag & Van Beek (1991).
[2] Tradilionally,  female  labnur  participation has heen very  low in the Netherlands. For instance. the participation rale  of
married wnmen  has been as low as 2% in 1947 and 4% in 1960.
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Tuhle  1.2 The relation between ‘inactives’ and ‘actives’ in selected  European countries
inncliw  ratio
cxcluding  old age pensions
Belgium
Dcnmark
France
Gcrmany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
Unitcd Kingdom
1 SI61
0.736
0.835
0.884
n.a.
0%
n.a.
0.808
Nare:  The so-called inactive ralio  is defined as the ratio belween  the number of pcople  receiving henefíts  and the number
of active workers. Sorrrre:  Nederlands Economisch Instituut, in Ministry of Social  Aifairs and Employment (1995), ll.
average.’  Thus, tahle 1.1 stil1 ovcrestimatcs Dutch labour participation.
Since 1970 the volume of social security beneficiarics has doublcd from 2.1 to 4.2 million bcnefit
years. Whereas in 1970 a person receiving a bcnefit had his support payed hy two activc workers,
at present each active worker in the Nethcrlands almost complctcly supports anothcr pcrson who
receives  a hcncfit. This so-called ‘inactive ratio’ has increased from 0.44 in 1970 to 0.85 in 1995.
The incidence of non-employability is even worse at the lower end of the labour markct. For
instance, every hundred low-skilled  workcrs have to support ninety sickness, disability or
unemployment beneficiaries, apart from othcr social security benefits.4
Until  now, the deterioration of thc inactive ratio has been primarily thc rcsult of the vast
increase of the number of social security bencficiaries. In thc next decade thc agcing population
will cause further upward pressures on thc development of the inactive ratio. In a recent study on
the development of thc Dutch economy in the period 1990-2015, two out  of three scenarios  show
that the inactive ratio wil1 deteriorate even further in the next ten years, from 0.86 in 1990 to
respectively  1.18 or 0.99 in 2005.” In all three scenarios  the deterioration of the inactive ratio is
mainly due to the increase of the number of aged people.  This dcmographic devclopment wil1
cause  considerable  additional  upward pressures on the social security budget, only to he compen-
sated by cutting down bcncfit gcnerosity even further or restraining the numbcr of bencficiaries in
other social security schcmes.
Yet, compared to other European countries, thc leve1 of the inactive ratio in the Nethcrlands
is not exceptionally high. Table  1.2 presents figures on the inactive ratio for several European
economies.  The overall inactive ratio is about average for these countries. Table  1.2 clearly shows
that most European countries can be characterized by large incomc transfers from thc active to thc
inactive population. Similar to the Dutch case, this is the rcsult of two developmcnts: the
[J] In the Netherlands 14% of all  men and 63% of al1  women  work part-time, as opposed 10  Tor instance  8.4’Z and 41.3%
in Sweden. 6.3% and 45% in the UK, and 2.2% and 30.7% in Germany (data for 1992, sec OECI)  (19950)).
141  Central  Planning Onice  ( 199 I ).
151  Central  Planning Office (1992).
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Tnhle  1.3 Social protection expenditures as a percentage of GW:‘,
in selected  Eurouean countries 1980-1993
Belgium 28.0
Denmark 28.7
France 2.5.4
Germany” 28.8
Ireland 20.6
1ta1y 19.4
Netherlands 30.1
Swcden n.a.
United Kingdom 2l.S
1980 198.5 1990 1993
29.3 27.0 27.6
27.8 29.8 33.2
28.8 27.7 30.9
28.4 26.9 27.6
23.6 1Y.S 21.4
22.6 24.1 25.8
31.7 32.2 33.6
;i:i ;iY; 2;Yi
’ At market prices
h Excluding the new Länder
No/e: Social protection expenditures refer 10  benefits which have been made up of transfers to households to cover social
risks. These social risks entail financial costs or loss  of income. and include  the following  categorics: sickness,
invalidity, disability. occupational accidents  and disease. old age, survivors, maternity, family, placement, vocational
guidance. resettlement.  unemployment and housing.  Sorrrre:  Eurostat (1995).
proportional increase in the ageing population and the earmarking of large parts of the labour force
as non-employable. Stil], whereas in most countries the population is already relatively agcd, this
has not yet heen the case in the Nctherlands. Thus, so far the low participation ratc  in the Nethcr-
lands is primarily due to substantial inactivity among persons of working age.
The vast increase of the volume of beneficiaries has caused  social security expenditures to rise
rapidly over the past decades. The further extension of social security acts, liheralizcd eligibility
conditions, rising benefit  levels  and increased maximum benefit  durations, have also contributed to
the rise of the social security budget. Thus, upward pressures on the social security budget are
caused both by price and volume components. Table  1.3 summarizes the share of social protection
expenditures in the gross domestic product. Social protection is a braad concept, covering  al1
social risks that entail financial costs or of loss of income for households. From inspection of table
1.3, it emerges that social expenditures take one-fifth to one-third of GDP. The Netherlands cannot
be considered as a major outlier, social expcnditures being somewhat above average.”
Taking into account the composition of the social expenditure budget this broad picture
changes dramatically, at least with regard to the Netherlands. Table  1.4 surveys  the ratio between
expenditures on work-relatcd insurance schemes  and total social protection expenditures. The
shares of these categories  in total outlays indicate  thc program wise variation between countries.
Large cross-national differences exist with regard to the share of unemploymcnt insurance,
probably due to different labour market conditions and diverse bcnefit levels. Tablc  1.4 clearly
shows that the share of disability and sickness benefit  programmes is roughly the same for al1
countries, with one major exception. Disability outlays in the Netherlands account for twice as
[o] Comparing social protection expenditures may  be tricky. Firsl, only pross figurcs are given. hut  nol  the net costs (gross
versus nel paymenl  of benefits). Sccond,  lax  expenditures do not appear  in the slatistics. Third, in addition to the public
expenditures one should also  take into account the private expenditures by employers and employces.
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Tahle 1.4 Disability, sickness and unemployment benefit  expenditures as a percentage of
total social protection expenditures in selected  European countries 1980-1993
Unemployment
1 !m lYY3
Belgium 9.6
Denmark 8.4
France 6.2
Germanyh 8.8
Ircland 6.3
ltaly 7.8
Netherlands 24.1
Swcdcn n.a.
United Kingdom 8.8
8.9 21.8 22.9
8.4 26.7 18.8
5.7 26.2 26.4
9.2 28.3 27.9
6.9 36.6 29.7
6.9 24.6 22.2
22.4 23.8 22.2
Yin; ;<:i1 Yi
9.2 10.0
10.8 12.6
4.3 6.8
3.1 5.9
8.0 14.5
2.3 2.1
6.1 9.2
n.a. n.a.
8.2 6.1
’ Occupational  accidcnts  rnd diseases excluded
* Excluding the new Länder
Source:  Eurostat  (1995).
much as the average share in the ether  countrics. Therc are no particular rrasons  Q priori to expcct
large cross-national differenccs in the potential  dcmand for disahility insurance, so the  question
raiscs  why Dutch disahility programmes are so expensivc, even after successive policy mcasures to
restrain the number of bencficiaries.
In conclusion, the Netherlands can he charactcrized by low labour participation, substantial  non-
cmployability among persons of working age and a high leve1 of public expenditures on social
insurance programmes (especially for disability schemes).  These eclectic  features can be linkcd by
considering the economie  effects  of social security.
$1.2 The econornic  eflects of social searrity
The development of a comprehensive system of social security is essential to the welfare of
Western European countries and is thcrefore often associated with highly developed welfare
stales.’ Social security contributes  to an equitable income distribution, reduces uncertainty,
promotes social mobility and conduces to macroeconomic stability. Still,  social security may cause
considerable  welfare losses as well,  due to behavioutial effects  on the supply side and the demand
side of the labour mark&.”  Social security programmes are largely  financed by employcr and
employee bornc contributions, which drive a wedge between gross labour costs  for thc employcr
and net earnings for the employee. The budgetary costs  of social security therefore directly add to
labour costs.  The tax wedge also indirectly affects  labour costs,  since wages are largely negotiated
on an after-tax basis. Generous benefïts levels,  extcnded coveragc and increased maximum benefit
[7J See e.p. Oudshwrn & Vijlbrief (1995).
(81 See Vijlbrief (1992). Jehocl-Gijsbcrs  e/ nl. (1995).
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duratjons  reduce  job-scarch and training inccntives for heneficiaries, leading  lo incrcasing
rcservation wagcs and longer  unemployment duration. Espccially  in thc lowcr segmcnts  of the
labour market, the differente  betwccn wagcs and thc minimum guarantccd income is very smal&
thus  leaving  semi- and unskilled bcneficiarics hardly bctter off after taking a job. These reduced
cfforts at self-support are reinforced by incomc-dependent subsidies and ether  mcans-tested welfare
programmes.
The welfare losscs  of social sccurity may bc  reinforcing, so that in an advcrsc economie
environmcnt a downward spiral may arise,  in which both cmployment and labour participation
decrease.’ In the Nethcrlands, social funds are financcd on a balanccd budget basis. Whcncver the
number of inactive workcrs rises, so will social security contributions  and gross labour costs  for
employers. Consequcntly, more workers are laid off and thc dcmand for social sccurity is trappcd
into a ncgative spiral, diverging further and furthcr from equilibrium.  This mechanism,  which is
sometimes referred to as the ‘social security trap’, is institutionally  established by the pay-as-you-
go financing system of social security. “’  After adverse shocks, the least productive  workers are
casily absorbed by social insurance programmes, since cligibility conditions are lenient and
enforcement loose. Utilizing  disability schemcs for redundant workers is in the interest of both
employtirs and workers: the former to circumvent firing costs  and to avoid social friction, the
latter  to safeguard genereus  and lengthy benefits. Thus, thc outflow to social sccurity is biased,
contributing to the rise of average labour productivity of employed workers, hut leaving redundant
workers permanently outside the labour force. Because of incrcasing  social security outlays and
diminishing tax and premium revenues, the wedge between gross labour costs  and after-tax
earnings increases, thus requiring remaining workers to be even more productive  and consequently
accelerating the number of redundancies among below-average  productive  workers. Hcnce, dut  to
inefficient  institutional  arrangements  in social security, adverse shocks may cause  a self-sustaining
spiral with detrimental and enduring effccts on labour demand and labour participation.
This ‘downward spiral’ has been aggravated by the changing social climatc and the failure to
devise active polities.  Due to massive unemployment, people have become aware of their legal
right to demand social security in case they become eligible, so that overall people may have
become habituated in obtaining benefts.  This practice puts mutual solidarity on the test and erodes
the sense of responsibility when applying for social security. Further, active labour market policics
have been insufficient  so far. Until now, the performance of the Public  Employment Service (PES)
has been mediocre. The employment agencies  and benefit-awarding  agencies  have failed to
collaborate  systematically, so that no effective sanction polities  have yet been carried  out for
bcneficiaries who fail to meet their obligations. It is therefore unlikely  that the PES  is able  to
increase the financial pressurc on benefit  claimants  to seek for a job. Conversely,  because of the
poor performance of the PES, the positive impact of its counselling  activities  on the motivation of
clients has been underutilized. The result  may easily be that people no longer  participate  in the
labour market, loose their skills  and see their job prospects fall,  lcading to a vicieus  circle  of
rejection and alienation.
Several policy measures can be devised as to promote  labour participation and to reverse the
downward @ral.  One obvious strategy  is to reduce the wedge by cutting down social security
[9] See e.p. Keuzenkamp e/ nl. (1993). Den Butler  (1993). May CC  Muysken (1992).
[IO] Van der Praag Ce Van Beek (1991).
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contribution rates.  The qucstion is whcthcr to reduce employee bornc or CmplOyer  hortte contribu-
tions.” Policy mcasurcs aimed at reducing thc employee’s wedge stimulates cmployment directly.
Reducing employcc  bornc  prcmiums mnkes  work morc  attractive  and stimulates labour Supply.
Dccreasing employcc’s contributions is also conducivc to wage rcstraint, as wagcs are mostly
negotiatcd on an aftcr-tax basis. Still, in thc long term  thc distinction bctwecn cutting down thc
employee’s wcdgc or the cmploycr’s wcdgc disappcars. Instcad of rcducing the overall tax wedgc,
it may bc morc  effcctive to focus on thc scgmcnts  of the labour market wherc economie  inactivity
is primarily concentratcd: thc lowcr end of the labour market. Onc  possibility, which is somctimes
rcfcrrcd to as the ‘Robin Hood strategy’,12 is to redistribute social sccurity contributions and
income taxes from low- to high-productivc workers, c.g. by giving cvcry employee a fixcd carned
incomc tax credit or a lump sum tax deductiblc item.”
Apart from rcducing the tax wedgc, sevcral othcr instrumcnts can bc  dcvised as to curb  the
deterioration of thc  inactive ratio. As of the mid 1980s,  various measures have been carried out  as
to improve thc functioning of the labour markct.  Onc  cffcctive strategy, which has extcnsively
been used in the Ncthcrlands, is wage rcstraint, so as to stimulate labour demand.14  Moreovcr,
the linkage mechanism between wages and benefits has largcly been suspcnded in thc past fifteen
years, so that wage-benefit ratios have decrcased and job-search incentives have been reinforced.
Eligibility conditions have been tightened and maximum benefit  durations have been reduccd.
These so-called ‘pricc polities’  have been relatively succcssful,  even though the averagc benefit
leve1 is stil1 very high compared to other European countries. Dcspite the increased demand for
social security, the ratio of social security outlays to GDP is now relatively stable.
Still, the beneficiary volume has not been curbed, especially with regard to disability
insurance. This is for a large part due to the highly complicated and fragmented character of the
organisational structure of the Dutch social security system. The so-called ‘social partners’ (trade
unions and employers’ organizations) stil1 play a dominant role in administering and implemcnting
social security programmes. Until very recently, the system of social security has failed to providc
incentives at the implcmentation stage as to have these interest groups pursue active polities  as to
restrain the number of beneficiaries. Only after several critical evaluations, a brood economie
policy debate has been initiated on rethinking the foundations of Dutch social security. As a
consequencc, it is now been widely perceived that the balance bctween ‘passive’  and ‘active’
polities  has to be redressed. A reciprocal concept of homc-support  has been devised. According
to this concept, beneficiaries do whatever they can as to provide  for their  own  means  of living.
Conversely,  the government supplies job-search assistance services and re-employment  pro-
grammes. One way to do so is to have the Public Employmcnt  Service and the benefit-awarding
agencies werk together, so as to increase the favourable  effects  of active labour market polities
and to monitor job-search efforts by unemployed.
[ 1 I] See e.g. Hagen (1995).
[ I2]  Sec Bovenherg e/ nl. (1994), Graatland (1994).
[ 131  As proposed  by the Advisory Commission on the Lower Segment of the Labour Marke1  (1994).
(141  Most Dutch economists agree on the beneficial  effects  of wage restraint on labour  demand.  See e.g. Dc Vries (1994)
and Broersma  (1995). Sec Kleinknecht (1994) for a dissident view.
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9 1.3 Ah of rhis snrdy
The object of this paper is to review recent cxpcricnces in rcforming social insurance schemes  and
implementing active labour markct policy in the Netherlands. This paper aims at discussing the
objcctives of the rcforms, descrihing the  mcasures that have been implemcnted and rcviewing
cvaluations on the impact of thc reforms. This study furthcr analyzcs rcmaining problems  and the
governmcnt’s intcntions on future rcforms that may bc ncccssary to solve these prohlems.
Thc paper is organizcd as fellows.  Chaptcr 2 is a vcry brief  introduction to thc currcnt Dutch
system of social security. This study distinguishcs three ma.jor policy approaches in reforming
social insurance. The first  approach is to rcvisc thc system  of social sccurity. In 1987 scven acts
have been implcmented  which form together the ‘1987 system rcform’. This system rcform wil1 be
discussed in chapter 3. A second approach, to be analyzcd in chaptcr 4, is to rcvisc the
organisational structure of social insurance so as to ensure an efficient and effective imple-
mcntation of these programmes. Thc tltird policy approach is to redress the balance between active
and passive labour markct polities.  According to this approach, which is discussed in chaptcr 5,
the Public Employment Service and benefit-awarding  agcncics collaborate,  so as to set up an
‘integral case assessmcnt’ of beneficiarics. Thus, prcvention and reintegration are used as active
strategies  to restrain  the number of benefit  rccipicnts. Chapter  6 discusscs the impact of the
reforms so far, analyzes  the chief  causes  of the problcms in Dutch social insurancc and reviews the
cabinet’s intentions.
Not all policy approaches have been equally  successful. The first policy strategy,  the so-
called ‘system reform’, is the oldcst and primarily aims at improving the cohcrcnce within the
system of social security. In lint with this approach, retrenchments are particularly  the rcsult of
reduced pricc components in the social security budget. By contrast, the othcr two policy
approaches can be characterized as volume-polities. The sccond  approach, rcforming the
organisational structure,  focuses  on the implementation stage of social insurancc and is thereforc a
process-oriented policy scheme. The third strategy, redressing the balance between active and
passive polities,  alters the foundations of social sccurity. According to this approach, reintegrating
benefit  claimants  is just as important as wage replacement  and minimum income guarantees.
Despite these differences, the three approaches that are distinguished here can been seen as
complementary, as they are strategies to safeguard thc future viability of social security (at the
macro level)  and as they are elements of an overall policy to improve labour market incentives  (at
thc micro leve]).
In the Netherlands, it is not yet customary to evaluate  new policy measures.‘” Still,  only very
recently several (parliamentary)  commissions have investigated various social security pro-
grammes. A very influential evaluation, which is discussed in chapter  4, is the Parliamentary
Inquiry on the implementation of social insurance. Further, in 1989 an extensive  research pro.ject
has been initiated, the so-called ‘Project Evaluation  of the Rcviscd System of Social Security’
[ 151  Note  that Ihe Ministry of Social  Affairs and Employment  publishes  a biannual Nir~<ab~ie/Socin/e  Ze&et&%f, which
surveys all  publications on social security and labour marke1  policy. All evaluation  assignmcnts  financed by the Ministry of
Social  Affairs and Employment are reviewed in the Government Budget  (Whitc  Papers (1995)). The reports  of the Social
Security Research Commission. an advisory board 10  the Ministry. are surveyed by Terpstra (1995).
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(PERS), hy the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Social Insurance Council and the
Dutch Association of Municipalitics. It  has not yet heen completcd, and not all of the project
groups have puhlished their reports, hut as far as thc PERS rcsults are relevant here, their
conclusions wil1 be rcferred to. The functioning of thc rcorganized Puhlic  Employmcnt  Service has
heen invcstigatcd hy the ‘Commission-Van Dijk’. This evaluation  report is discussed in
chaptcr 5. “’
[ici] Other ma,jor  evaluations,  which wil1  nat be reviewed here. are the reports  by lhe ‘Doelman-Pel-Commission’  and the
‘Van der Zwan-Commission’  on national  assistance programmes.
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Chaper  2 Brief overview of the Dutch social security system
This chapter providcs a brief  overvicw of thc currcnt  system of social sccurity in thc Nethcrlands.
Section 2.1 introduces  thc main charactcristics of thc  system.  Section 2.2 discusscs thc main
functions of social sccurity and thc linkagc mechanism bctwcen wages and bcncfits. Scction 2.3
bricfly sketches  thc administration of social sccurity schcmcs.
Tablc 2.1 summarizes the organization of thc social sccurity system in the Ncthcrlands. Within the
Dutch system a distinction is made between social insurance and social provisions. Social
insurance schemcs arc  divided into employec insurance schemcs and general insurance schcmes.
The division betwecn  these two kinds of arrangements  is based on thc scope  of the application:
social insurance schemcs are national  programs  covering  all rcsidents, whereas cmploycc insurance
schemes  cover only private sector workcrs (civil  servants have thcir own schemes).  Social
assistance programmes are welfare provisions for thosc who  are not ablc to providc for thcir own
means of living and who  are not eligiblc to social insurance schcmes.
The primary diffcrence betwccn social insurance and social provisions lies in their financing
and administrativc modes. In principle,  both employec insurance schcmes and general insurance
schemes  are financed out of mandatory  contributions by employees  and self-cmployed.  All social
insurance programmcs (excluding  child care allowances) are financcd by a pay-as-you-go  system,
so that contribution rates cover expected risks. By contrast, social assistancc  provisions are funded
by general revenues. Social insurance programmes are administcred by industrial  associations
managed by employers and employees. The administration of welfare provisions is assigncd to the
Social Security Institute (Sociale Verzekeringsharzk).
Employees’  insurance includes provisions against the loss of income due to uncmploymcnt (New
Unemployment Benefits Act, nww), sickncss (Sickness Benefits Act, ZW),” disability (Disable-
ment Insurance Act, WAO) and medical care (Health  Insurance Act, ZFW). General  insurance
schemes  are national  programmes that cover the risks of old age (Genera1  Old Age Pension Act,
AOW), disability (Genera1 Disablement Benefits Act, AAW) and exceptional hcalth costs  that arc  nat
covered by health tost  insurance (General Act on Exceptional Medical Expenses, AWBZ). In
addition, general  insurance schemes include child benefits (Gencral Family Allowances  Act, AKW,
financed out of gcneral revenue) and provisions for widows and orphans (Gcneral Widows’ and
Orphans’ Pensions Act, AWW).‘~
Social assistance composes of unemployment assistance (State Group Regulations for Unem-
ployed Werkers,  RWW), public assistance (National Assistance Act, ABW), supplementary  benefits
(Supplementary  Bcnefits Act, TW), social employment service (Sheltered Employment Act, wsw)
[ 171  Only very  recently, Parliament  has decided to larpely  privatize  the Sickness Bcnefits  Acts. See scction 4.3.
[IS]  As of July  1996, thc AAW  is to be replaced by the a more stringent survivors’ benefits act.
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Tnhle  2.1 The organisation of the Dutch social security system
Arrangemen( Adtrrirristralion Sirpervision
Social insurance Uncmployment insurance (nww)
(cmp’oyee insurnncc) Sickness  insurance (7,~)~
Induslrial
Associations”
Supervisory Board
for Social Insurance
Disabilily insurance (WAO)
Social insurance
(national insurancc)
Social assistance
Heallh  cos1  insurance (ZTW)
Exceplional health  cos1  insurancc (Awn7.j
Child care  allowances (AKW)
Old age pensions (Aow)
Survivors insurance (AWW)c
Disabilily insurance (AAW)
Supplementary  benefits (TW)
Health  Insurance
Funds
Social Securily
Inslilute
Industrial
Associations’
Heahh  Insurance
Council
Supervisory  Board
for Social Insurance
Supplemenlary  benefìts  (IOAWIIOAZ) Minister of Social
Sokal  / unemployment  assistance (hnw/nww)
Municipal Affairs andauthorilies
Employment
Social employment service (WSW)
” Coordinated by TICA
h As of March  1996.  the zw will be larpely  privatized.  See section 4.3
’ As of Julv  1996,  the AWW will be replaced by a new survivors’ benefits act
and assistance to senior or partially  disabled, unemployed or former self-employed persons  (Act on
Income  Provisions for Older oc Partially Disabled, Unemployed Workers, IOAW, and Act on
Income  Provisions for Older or Partially Disahled, Former Self-Employed, IOAZ).
$2.2 Benefit  generosity  and !lte  nel-net  link
The two fundamental principles  of the Dutch social security system are mutual solidarity and thc
responsibility of the government to protect its residents from poverty. From these principles  thc
two primary functions of the system follow: wage replaccment and minimum incomc guarantee.
Thc former is a form of mutual solidarity among employees and employers as to protect the
employees’ acquired standards of living. The latter, which is somctimes called thc safcty net, is a
constitutionally established form of mutual solidarity betwcen all residcnts. Besides these more
traditional functions, it has now been widcly acknowlcdged that re-employing and reintegrating
beneficiaries into the labour force is an explicit  function of social sccurity as wel]. The
reintegration function expresses thc reciprocal character of the relation between the state and its
citizens. Only these who  are not ablc to provide  for their own mcans  of living arc  cligible  to social
security bcnefits. Those who are alrcady in a social security programme have the obligation to
scarch for a job as to re-cntry into the labour market. Converscly, thc statc does not only providc
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Tahle  2.2 Beneficiary  volume and total expenditures for major social security schemes”
Nunlher  of herrcjìciaries Tofal  expwditures
(x 1000 persorrs) (in rrrilliard  glrildcrs)
Uncmployment insurancc (WW)
Disability insurancc (WAO/AAW)
Sickness insurancc (ZW)
Otd  agc pensions (AOW) 2,152 32.5
Child bcnefits allowanccs (AKW) 1,812 6.9
SUlViVors' ifi.SUranCC (AWW) 194 4.8
SOCial  assistancc (ABW) 184 3.9
Uncmployment  assistance (RWW) 326 6.9
Supplementary henefits (TW/IOAZ/IOAW) 126 1.1
’ Figures  for 1994.
Sorrrce:  mv  (1995n), Central  Bureau of Slatistics.
332 9.0
894 21.6
17.5 5.2
for benefits, it actively helps beneficiaries by means of job-scarch assistance and rc-employment
programmes.
The benefit  levels  of social insurance programmes and welfare provisions are all relatcd to
the after-tax minimum wage. The gencrosity of the Dutch social sccurity system has thcrcforc
primarily been dependent on the Icvcl and development of the statutory minimum wage. This is a
consequente  of the ‘net-net link’ (neflo-ne//o  koppeling) bctween flat-rate  benefits and thc net
minimum wage. Thus, if contract wages in the private sector rise, and the minimum wage
increases, so does the generosity of income-support measures. In the past fifteen ycars this linkage
mechanism has mostly been suspendcd, as to rcdress job-search incentives for beneficiarics and to
cut down social security expenditures. Sincc 1992 this practice has bccome law, as the link has
legally  been made conditional.‘v The net-net link is now only to be applied when wages do not
rise excessively and the ratio between the number of social security beneficiaries to employed
persons does not excecd a rcference leve].
$2.3 Social  sccwity adminisrration2”
As pointed out in section 2.1, social security programmes are administrated by two kinds of
bodies. Work-related  social insurance schemes, including the AAW, are administrated by ninetcen
industrial insurance associations (bedrijfsverenigingert).  These associations, which are organizcd
per industrial sector or occupation, are managed by representatives  of employers and employees.
Bccause of its similarity to the WAO, the AAW is also implcmentcd by the industrial insurance
[19] See Vijlbrief & Van de Wijngaert  (1995).
[ZO]  Sec also chapter  4.
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associations. National insurance schcmcs covcring dcmographic risks are administcred hy the
Social Security Institutc, in which formcrly indcpendcnt Labour Boards have heen integrated as
regional agencies. Similar to the industrial associntions this institutc also consists of representatives
of employers and cmployccs. National assistancc programmcs arc  administrated by municipalitics,
supervised by thc Ministry of Social Affairs and Employmcnt. Finally, thc ZFW  and thc AWBZ arc
hoth  administcred by hcalth insurancc funds and dcsignatcd privntc hcalth insurance companies,
under supcrvision of thc Hcalth Insurance Council.
Until recently, thc Social Insurance Council (Socinle  Verzekcringsrnnd,  svr) supcrvised the
industrial insurancc associations and the Social Sccurity Institutc. Trade unions, employcrs’
associations and governmcnt appointces all had equal shares of mcmbcrs in this council. In
addition to its supervisory tasks, thc svr bas heen an advisory board to thc Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employmcnt. Informally thc insurancc associations coopcrated in a Federation of
Industrial Insurancc Associations (Federnrie vm Bedr~~~vererrigingert,  FBV). Whcn the new Social
Security Organization Act came into effect,” the svr and thc FBV have been abolishcd. The
supervisory tasks of the svr have been transferrcd to thc Supcrvisory Board for Social Insurance
(College van Toezicht Sociale Verzekeringen, CTSV),  which has a board of three independent
members. Most of the coordinating, regulatory and advisory tasks of the former Social Insurance
Council are now conccntrated in a Temporary Institute for Coordination and Tuning (Tijdelijk
Insliluul voor Coördinatie ctr  Afstetnming,  TICA). This institutc can be regardcd as a succcssor of
thc Federation of Industrial Associations.
1211  See section  4.2
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Chpter  3 First approach: Renovating the social security system
As of thc latc  197Os,  thc demand for welfare statc scrviccs  riscs  stcadily, and so do puhlic
cxpcnditures on incomc maintcnance. Yct, it was not until 1987 bcforc substantial policy mcasurcs
have been carricd out  as to curtail the high costs  of social sccurity. In 1987 sevcn bills  have comc
into effect that togethcr form the ‘system  rcform’ (s/elsel/~erzienirrg)  in Dutch social security.
Section 3.1 hricfly describcs this rcform. Scction 3.2 analyzcs thc system rcform and discusscs the
cxtent to which its ohjectives  have been attaincd. Section 3.3 discusscs subscquent policy mcasurcs
and highlights rcmnining problems.
$3.1  Tlte  1987 system rejorm
Thc system reform has been initiated by thc ccntcr-right coalition govcrnment under Prime
Minister Lubbers. In 1983 this cabinct had asked thc Social and Economie  Council and thc Equal
Rights Council for advice on thc revision of unemployment and disability schemcs and related
social assistancc provisions.22 In this mandatory rcqucst for advice,  the government released a set
of concrete proposals to reform social insurance.2’ In its request for advicc, the government gave
three primary motives for a system reform, namcly thc need to back thc leve1 of public spcnding,
the inability of the currcnt system to copc with the scalc  and the structural nature of economie
inactivity, and the desire to create more individual financial indcpcndence within the system. More
spccifically, thc government hoped to achieve four major goals.2J  Fitst  of all, the govcrnment
desired to cut back the social security budget, in the interests of cconomic recovery and as to
warrant its future viability. Next, the cabinct favoured to promote cohcrencc within the system and
betwcen the system and adjacent legislation. Thirdly, the government wanted to modernize the
social security system, among other things by making the system more compatible with new work
patterns and extra-marital forms of cohabitation. Fourthly, the government wished to climinate
certain imbalances  and inequities within the social security system, such  as the unequal treatment
of males and females and of long-term unemployed and disabled.
The main features of the 1987 system rcform can bc  summarized as follows. First,
unemployment insurance has been drastically revised. The former Unemployment Bencfits Act
(WW) and the Unemployment Provision Act (W W V) have been rcplaced by the New Unemploymcnt
Bcnefits Act (nww), so that the arrangcments for short-term and long-term unemploymcnt bcnefits
1221  In case of ma.]or  revisions of social policy, the Dutch government is obliged to consult several advisory bod&,  such as
the Social  and Economie  Council, the Equal Right Council and the Council of State. The Social  and Economie  Council is
the highest advisory body on socio-economie affairs. The Social  and Economie  Council equally consists of union
federations, employers’ associations and so-called ‘Crown members’ (i.e., indcpcndent  experts, to be appointed  by the
government). Note that these extensive consultancy procedures are time-consuming  and may  raise serious institutional
barriers to social innovation.
(231 See WRR (1985).
1241  See De Jong e/ n/.  (1990) and Aarts & De Jong (1992).
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have  heen intcgrated.  Unemploymcnt has heen rcdcfincd. Employccs are now cligihle to unem-
ployment  bcnefits if thcy lose at Icast five hours or half of thcir numbcr of weckly work hours.
The maximum bcncfit duration has becomc dcpcndcnt upon thc work record,  and is cxtcndcd from
six months to twelvc months (in accordance with thc formcr WWV). Voluntary uncmploycd, who
were prior to reform cligiblc to uncmploymcnt assistnncc  arrangcmcnts (RWW), arc  now covcred
by thc nww. Former conscripts and wilful uncmployed, who  wcrc  in principle  cntitled to
unemploymcnt incomc provisions, are now fully cligiblc to uncmployment bcncfits. If bcncfit
claimants do not (fully) meet to all cligibility conditions, industrial associations can impose
sanctions, either by refusing (part ot) thc bcncfit or by rcducing thc benefit  duration.
With rcgard  to disability schcmes, prior to rcform thc asscssmcnt of thc dcgrec of disability
was not only based on mcdical factors,  hut also on labour markct  conditions. Abjudicators  had to
take into account the potential difficultics partially  disabled may expcrience in finding cmployment.
This ‘labour market consideration’ in thc disability assessment has been climinated. Ncxt, the
minimum guarantecd incomc for uncmploymcnt and disability bcncficiaries has been protccted by
the introduction of two ncw laws, a supplcmentary bencfits act (TW) and an income provision act
for senior and disablcd uncmployed (IOAW ). If sickncss, uncmployment or disability bcnefits fall
bclow  the minimum guaranteed incomc, supplcmentary benefits may be applied for. In order to
prevent older and partially  disabled persons who  arc  uncmploycd from falling  down into means-
and wealth-tested  social assistance after their unemploymcnt or disability bcnefit cxpires, the IOAW
supplemcnts the total income of thcsc  pcrsons  and thcir partners up to the minimum guaranteed
incomc. With regard to the benefit  levcl,  aftcr  reform bcnefit-wage ratios  for social insurancc
programmes have been reduced to scventy per cent. *’ The ‘net-net’ link bctween flat-rate  bencfits
and the net minimum wage has been suspended, and so has thc  adjustment  of thc  minimum wage
to changing costs  of living (though only temporarily).
$3.2 Evaharing  the 1987 sysrem  rejorm
The 1987 reform seems to have had little effect on restraining thc volume of disability bcnefici-
aries. Table  3.1 illustrates  that the numbcr of disability bcnefit recipicnts continues to rise after
1987. The abolition of thc non-employability provision may not have had the expccted impact on
the inflow of new disability beneficiaries.  Whereas the government estimated thc volume of hidden
unemployment  in the WAO/AAW at almost fifty per cent, in the official evaluation report the
unemployment component has been adjusted to only about ten per cent of the total disability
population.*” One possible explanation is that the remaining working capacity of recent disability
beneficiaries may have been overestimated, since disability  enrolment had already lost most of its
attraction, both in terms of benefit  generosity and Icniency. *’ Further, thc average degrec of
disability of pre-reform beneficiaries may have increased due to previous attempts as to apply  thc
labour markct consideration more strictly.  Moreover, the impact of the new ruling on disability
asscssments may have been overestimated, provided that thc responsible administrative  bodies  have
12.51  Note  that some  of these benefit  cuts have already  been carried  oul  before  1987.
1261  Ministry of Social  Affairs and Employment  (1990).
1271  De Jong r/  nl. (1990) and De Jong & Aarts (1992). See also Besseling  CF Sprenper  (1991). In the period 1980-1985,
modal  heneficiaries  had already  lost 25% of their  after-tax  purchasing  power.
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Tuhlc  .?.I Unemployment, sickness and disability programmes 1986-1995
afvrage  nlrmber  q/ heitefils dcpmdcncy  rolc” mal  cxpenditwes
(x 1000 persom) @er 1000 persons  at risk) (irt  milliard  guilders)
Wwh ZW WAOIAAW WWh zw WAO/AAW WWh zw WAOIAAW
1986 68 263 778
1987 129 277 793
1988 172 288 814
1989 173 317 844
1990 163 348 X81
1991 17s 348 903
1992 208 341 912
1993 269 345 921
1994 332 17s 894
1995’ 363 173 873
1.9 7.2 10.6 1.6 7.0 16.8
3.4 7.3 11.0 3.1 7.3 16.9
4.4 7.3 11.0 3.8 7.7 17.0
4.2 7.6 l l . 2 3.8 8.7 17.2
3.8 7.9 11.4 4.0 10.2 20.1
3.9 7.7 l l . 3 4.4 10.5 21.1
4.6 7.4 l l . 2 5.5 10.6 21.9
5.9 7.4 11.0 7.2 11.0 21.9
7.2 3.x 10.5 9.0 5.2 21.6
3.7 4.s 10.2 9.2 4.2 20.8
’ Defined as the number of benefíciaries  per thousand  persons  at risk
h As of 1987 the WW  includes formcr WWV beneficiaries
’ Average  of January  10  November
Snrrrr~:  CTSV  ( 19950  and 1996).
been able to ad.just to thc ncw ruling at all.2x
Tahle  3.2 survcys various estimates of the ‘hiddcn unemployment component’ in disability
programmes. Al1 studies that hoth refer to the pcriod beforc 1987 and analyze thc inflow into
disability schemes“’ show that a large share of disability spells (thirty to fifty per cent) can be
related to labour market conditions. The only study that uscs  data after the system reform shows
that the labour market related inflow into disability schemcs is ten to twelve per cent, in accord-
ante  with the official evaluation. Hence, as of 1987 the labour markct related influw  into thc
WAO/AAW  may have diminishcd considerably, and without the system reform the numbcr of
benefit  claimants may have increased even more.“” Nonctheless, the system rcform has failed to
tackle the volume of existing beneficiaries. Systematic  re-examinations of disahility beneficiaries
have been restricted to persons  younger than thirty-five years, hercby examining only ten per cent
of the total disability population.”
Because of increased coverage and extended benefit  duration, the volume of recipients of
unemployment insurance has almost tripled. The inclusion of new categories  of werkers  who have
become eligible to the WW  has lead to a structural increase in the number of beneficiaries of
thirteen per cent, of which three-quarters is due to bcncfit claims by partially disablcd.‘* The
[28] See De Jong R Aarts (1992).
1291  Thus, ah studies except  for Westerhout (1995) and Hassink et nl. (1995). The fermer  analyzes  the .r/ock  of disability
benefìciaries, the latler  uses data on 1990.
[JO]  Of the most recent studies, Westerhout  (1995) analyzes  the s/ork  of disahility  programmes and concludes that stil1  half
of non-participalion due to disability insurance can bc  characterizcd  as hidden unemployment, whereas Hassink er nl.
(1995), using data on disability irr/lon:r,  fínd that only ten 10  lwelve  oer cent of transitions into  disabilily  insurancc are due
to labour market conditions. Moreover, as of 1987 the fraction  of partially  disabled  steadily riscs, causing thc magnitude of
disabilhy  benefits  to diminish.
[3/] De Jong & Aarts (1992).
1221  Ministry of Social  Affairs and Employmcnt (19941)).
15
Tdde  3.2 The bidden  unemployment component in disahility programmes
Aurlw(s)
Van den Bosch &
Petcrsen  (I983n)
Van den Bosch &
Pclersen (19831~)
Dtllfl
sccloral  data, 196%  1979
macro data. 1968-  1982
Collchrsion.s
the prowlh  of disnbility  incidcncc rales  is for a large  part
rclaled  IO  dcteriorating  labour marke1  conditions
as of Ihc cnrly  1970s. ~hc  hiddcn uncmploymcnt  componcnl  in
thc WAO stcaclily  riscs to 220.0(W)  benefit  years (46%) in 1982,
sec alsn Van den Bosch CG  Pctcrsen  (1980)
Roodenburg R secloral  data. 1971-1981 as of the early 1970s. IIIC  labour market  relatcd  inllow inlo the
Wang Meeuw Hing WAO stendily  rises lo 36% in 1981
(1985)
Aarts &i De Jong
(1992, chaptcr  5)
Westerhout (1995)
micro  data on workers, 1980 hidden unemploymcnl  component is approx. 30%50% of
disahilily volume
macro data. 1973-1992 half oF total disnhility hcncfil  years (WAO. AAW  and ZW)  in the
pcriod  1973-1991  can bc  characterized  as hiddcn unemploymenl
Hassink e/ nl. (1995) firm-leve1  data, 1990 IO-l2%,  of the oulflow  lo disahility is due lo redundancy
price component in the ww  has diminishcd slightly, among othcr things as a result  of the
introduction of (lower) follow-up hcncfits. Aftcr rcform, thc numhcr of imposcd sanctions in thc
WW  steadily rose from 27,000 in 1987 to SI ,000 in 1991.”  Half of the sanctions are rclatcd to
‘reproachahle unemploymcnt’, though large differcnccs hctwccn industrial associations cxist,
primarily dut  to hranch-specific  factors  and interpretation prohlcms. Thc cffcctivity of sanction
policics is severcly retardcd hy two organisational prohlems.  Though thc PES has to inform
industrial  associations when hencficiarics do not meet their ohligations, it does  not always do so.
And, it was not until 1991 that industrial councils have monitorcd joh-scarch efforts of hcncfici-
aries systematically.
With regard to the cohcrence and the transparcncy of social sccurity, the rcformcd system
explicitly distinguishes hetween wage-rcplacement and minimum guaranteed income.  By the
introduction of the supplementary henefits act the wage replacement schcmes no longer  have a
safety net function..‘”  Thus contrihutions to work-rclated insurance schcmes cover cxpected risks
properly  and eyuivalence prcvails  in social insurancc. Whercas prior to rcform workcrs were
covcred by diverse and multiple programmes, now all social insurance programmcs in principle
correspond to different risks. Despite this analytical improvement, thc implementation of the social
security system has becomc more intricate. In illustration of the increased administrative complex-
ity, after reform the staff of thc industrial associations and other executive  bodies has expanded
considerably (by at least 5.0% in 1987). Administrative costs  have also riscn structurally, by
approximately 100 million  Dutch guilders (17.7%) in 1987.‘” Thc assessment of eligihility
[33] In ‘1  Groen R Koehlcr (1993).
[34] Note  that the budgetary  cos&  of these new supplcmenlary  arrangements  has heen more or less  in accordance with
initial expcctations.  Thus, the impact of changes  in the safely  net function  have been estimated correclly. With regard  lo
social assistance arrangements,  here actual cos&  deviate suhstanlially  from original eslimates.  However,  thcsc deviations
seem 10  be due to exogenous  develnpmenls  rather  than tn the system refnrm. Sec Minislry of Social  Affairs and
Employment  (1992 and 1991).
[35] Own calculatinns.  on the hasis of svr (1989). Adminislralive  cosls  of social assislance  arrangcmenls  seems nnt to have
increased slruclurally,  sec Ministry nT Social  Affairs and Emplnymcnt  (1991).
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conditions in thc ncw Uncmploymcnt Bcncfits Act has bccomc IIIO~C  complex,  as COVCragC  bas
hccomc morc  hctcrogcncous.  Though thc climination of thc labour markct considcration has
disentanglcd disahility and uncmploymcnt componcnts in thc AOW/AAW,  thc asscssmcnt of ‘mixed’
hcncfit Icvels  for  partially disabled may have bccome more complicatcd as wcll.  AS a result  of thc
introduction of supplcmentary bencfits, uncmploymcnt and disability bcncficiarics may bc eligiblc
to two kinds of bcncfits, thus making administrativc proccdurcs  morc  intricate.
Work-rclatcd cmploycc insurancc schcmcs arc now fully individualizcd, so that cqual rights
for men and womcn are institutionally cstablishcd in social insurancc programmcs. Partially
disabled and senior uncmploycd pcrsons  arc  trcatcd more equally.  Prior to rcform, partially
disablcd wcrc  cligiblc  to full wage rclatcd  bcncfits of unlimited duration, whcrcas oldcr uncm-
ploycd workcrs fcll down to social assistancc aftcr thcir bcncfits cxpircd. Sincc thc non-
cmployability  provision has been abolishcd and both groups  have bccomc cligiblc to supplcmcntary
bcncfits, this uncqual trcatmcnt has largcly  been rcmovcd. Thc incrcascd importante  of thc
minimum guarantcc income has noncthclcss not rcduced the dcmand for social assistancc schcmes,
which contain tests on wcalth, incomc and household composition. With rcgard to cqual rights,
this situation is peculiar since for supplementary benefit  schcmcs no inherent  incomc and wealth
tests  apply.
$3.3 Rentaining  prohlerns and subwqmvrt  policy  n~easwes
After thc 1987 reform, the safety net function of social security has becomc more prominent,  at
the expense of wage-replacement. The share of abovc-minimum bcnefit recipiency in social
insurance programmes has diminishcd considerably, so that morc  bcncficiarics find themselves in
the safety net of social security.%  This tcndency may entail adversc fiscal externalities..”
Workers have cver been anxious as to reducc their financial risks on the private insurance market,
and firms have encouragcd supplcmcntary contracts as to avoid resistance of cmployecs after their
dismissal. These contracts may gcnerate advcrse externalities on the governmcnt budget, as it
invites ‘moral hazard’ bchaviour. One can obsctve that successive benefit  cuts have at least
partially been ‘repaired’ through collectivc agreements. Sincc it is stil1 customary that the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Employmcnt legally extcnds collective  labour agrcements, thc effects  of these
benefit  cuts have partially been nullified. Whether these supplementary contracts have actually
caused considerable  upward pressurcs on the government budget is doubtful, but it surely has
thwarted the credibility and consistcncy of social policy. And, if not repaired, thc consequent
tcndency towards thc minimum guaranteed income may have fostered thc demand for all sorts of
income dependcnt subsidies,  such  as rent subsidies, child care and home help,  causing govcrnment
outlays  to risc  indirectly.
Despite many alterations and improvements in the social security system, and more
specifically  the extcnsion of sanction polities,  thc 1987 reform does not solvc thc problem that
Dutch social insurance fails to provide  inccntives for unemploycd and disabled to re-entry into the
labour force. Though after reform employec bcnefits have become Icss lcnient and gencrous, so
that job search incentives may have been rcinforccd, thc minimum guarantecd income is stil1 very
136) Dc Jong ct ol.  (I  990).
1.371  Van der Ploeg & Tculinps  (1992).
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mhigh. Espccially in the lowcr scgmcnts of thc labour  mark% thc diffcrcncc bctwecn  wages and thc
minimum guarantccd incomc is smal], thus Icaving low-skilled uncmploycd and disablcd hardly
bcttcr  off aftcr taking a job. Thc inhcrcnt incomc and wealth tests  in social assistancc  schcmcs,  as
WC]]  as incomc-dcpcndcnt  subsidies  aggravatc this failurc of thc social sccurity system.  Furthcr,
thc rcform  does nat includc any mcasurcs  as to have thc Public Employmcnt Scrvicc  (PEs) and
bcncfit-awarding agcncics collaborate  systcmatically, so that no cffcctivc sanction policy can yct bc
carricd out..1x  At implcmcntation stage major diffcrcnccs in imposing sanctions occur, ~UC  t0
diversc intcrprctations  of cligibility conditions in various industries.  On balancc, thc 1987 reform
has nat really contributcd to rcdrcssing thc balancc bctwccn  activc  and passive labour markct
policics.
Thc most important failurc of thc system  reform is probably  that aftcr 1987 thc volume of
hcneficiarics continucd to risc  stcadily. Whcn it bccamc clcar that thc impact of thc system reform
on thc volume of social insurancc fcll short of its initial expcctations, threc  ncw bills  have been
draftcd as to dcvelop more cffective volume-polities.  Thcsc thrce acts, which have becomc
cffective as of 1992, 1993 and 1994, specifically aim at rcstraining thc numbcrs of sickness and
disability bcneficiaries,  both by providing financial inccntives for cmploycrs and employces and by
tightening the access  to social security. Employers have been obliged to pay at least seventy per
cent of previous earnings in the first two or six weeks of sickness leave (depcndent upon company
size).”  Contribution rates  for sickncss hcncfits have been differentiatcd to industry and firm
leve]. Table  3.1 illustrates  that these measurcs have had a tremcndous effect on thc incidence of
sickness leavc. Prior to thc ncw ruling, the average number of sickness spells was 300,000. Only
two ycars later, in 199S,  the amount of avcrage sickness spells fel1 to 209,000.4”  The amount of
disbursed bcnefits fel1 from 8.7 milliard Dutch guildcrs in 1993 to 4.2 milliard guildcrs in
1995.4’
With regard to disability programmes, in addition to the abolition of thc non-employability
provision in 1987, disability has been redcfined again. Under the new ruling, thcrc  now must bc  a
straight relation bctwcen the impairment and the employment disability. Adjudicators no longer
take into account the claimant’s education and fermer  occupation.  Thc maximum duration of
disability benefits has become depcndent upon the employee’s  agc, and so bas thc  ]cvel  of the
follow-up bcnefit. For new disability claimants this implies  that the bencfit  ]cve] is seventy per
cent of their previous earnings, after which benefits gradually dcclinc to only scventy per cent of
thc minimum wage. Those who  are alrcady in the scheme  wil1 bc  re-examined and partially
disabled are obliged to accept available jobs. A ‘bonus-malus’ system has been introduced  to crcate
financial incentives for employers as to discourage thc use of sickness and disability  schemes  and
to stimu]ate reintegration for people with few job opportunities.42
This package of measures has had a significant effect on the volume of disability  bencfici-
aries.4’ Not only is thc inflow to disahility tightencd again, this is the first time that al]
bcneficiaries who  are alrcady in thc schcmc are rc-examincd systematically,  thus tackling  thc
[38]  See  section  5 . 2 .
[39]  This spring. Parliamenl  has agreed to extend  this  period  10  fifty-two weeks. See section  4.3.
[40]  Fipures for November 1993 and 1995. Source: CTSV  (1996). The T7.  Act has Inkome  effeclive  on January lsl, 1994.
1411  c-rsv (1996).
[42]  This ‘bonuslmalus’  system has meanwhile heen abolished. moslly  because employers íïnd  this arrangement unfair: in
disahility  programmes no distinction has yet been made hetween  professional risks and social risks.
1431  Sec  crsv  ( 1 9 9 5 6 ) .
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cxtraordinary incidencc of disahility spells in thc Ncthcrlands. Whcrcas in 1993 the nurnhcr  of
disability bcnefits amountcd to 894,000, this figure has droppcd to 862,000 in 199S.44 This has
been the vcry first timc  that the numbcr of disability hcncficiarics has diminished sincc the
introduction of the WAO in 1967. Further, thc disahility depcndcncy ratc,  dcfined as thc number of
bcncficiarics per thousand persons at risk, has dcclincd from 11 .O per thousand workcrs in 1993 to
10.2 per thousand in 1995. The total amount of dishurscd disability bcnefits has dccreased with six
per cent  in two ycars,  from 21.9 milliard guilders in 1993 to 20.6 milliard in 1995.
In short, dcspitc thc unprcccdcntcd drastic  charactcr of thc 1987 rcform,  onc  can doubt whether
thc foundations of social insurancc have been affccted. Thc institutional and fundamental
characteristics of social sccurity have not been altcrcd, and thc numbcr of bcncficiarics has only
decreased aftcr succcssivc policy mcasurcs  as of 1992. It  may stem more appropriate  to speak of
‘renovating’ rather  than ‘rcforming’ thc system of social security. Thus, despite its ambitieus
nickname, the 1987 ‘system reform’ now mercly appcars as a cumulation of policy measures
within an existing system, as has been pointcd out  rccently by a Parliamentary Inquiry
Commission.4” Morcover, this Parliamcntary Inquiry, which has investigated the organisational
structure of social insurance programmcs, shows that legislativc intentions can casily become
strandcd at the implementation stage. This is the subject of the ncxt chapter.
[44]  UW  ( 1 9 9 6 ) .  Figures  for  1 9 9 3  a n d  n o v e m b e r  1995.  Nok  that Ihe TRA A c t  h a s  come  into  e f f e c t  x o f  A u g u s t u s  lst,
1993.
(4.51  See als0  Lmeris  & Snijders (1994).
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Clzapter  4 Second  approach: Reforming the organisational structure
Thc framcwork of currcnt  social sccurity design hns Iargcly  been hascd on thc consensual and
ncocorporatist naturc  of thc Dutch cconomy in thc 1950s  and 1960~.~” Historically-grown powcr
rclations  bctwcen unions, cmploycrs’ confcdcrations and govcrnmcnt are stil1 prcscnt  in thc current
administration of sociai security. Thc dominant rolc  of thc so-callcd ‘social partners’ in the
organisational structure of social insurancc programmcs has far-rcaching conscqucnces for thc
functioning of exccutivc bodics, cspccially  with rcgard to thc cffcctivcncss of volume policics.
This is for a largo part dut  to a lack of checks  and balances in thc initial  design of social sccurity
as wcll as in succcssive extensions and modifications of social insurancc programmes, as has
recently been pointcd out  by a Parliamentary Inquiry. Thus, thc largc demand for social security
provisions can at Icast partly tic ascribed to its  complicatcd and dispcrscd organisational structure.
Section 3.1 bricfly dcscribcs the attcmpts  to rcorganize thc organisational structure and further
surveys thc main fïndings  of the Parliamentary Inquiry. Ncxt, in section 3.2, recent efforts as to
reform the implcmentation of social insurancc programmes are discussed, primarily hased on the
ncw  Social Security Organization Act. Section 3.3 asscsscs  rcmaining problems  in thc stn/rrs  quo
and discusses thc intentions of thc current coalition governmcnt.
94.1  Parliamenrary Inquiry Comrnission  Buurmeijer
The Social Security Organization Act of 1950 has been foundcd on the concept of functional
dccentralization. According to this concept, central authoritics have no reason for intcrvention if
the parties concerned are able to implement  social insurance schcmes themselves. Functional
decentralisation thcreforc rcfers to the devolution of authority to implcment social insurancc
lcgislation  to representatives  of employers and employees. This appeal for ‘subsidiarity’ or
‘sovereignty in one’s own circle’ is reflccted by the foundation of industrial insurance associations
and the Social Insurancc Council.
Social partners have always resisted a dominant role for thc governmcnt in supervising and
implementing social security acts. Already  in 1967, the Minister of Social Affairs Vcldkamp
requested the Social and Economie  Council for advice on a ncw organisational structure.
Veldkamp  suggestcd that al1 social sccurity schemcs were to bc administrated by one organization.
However,  social partners  could not come  to an agreement on this proposal. Twclve years later, thc
Ministry of Social Affairs decided to insta11 an advisory commission as to rcvise thc organisational
structure of social sccurity. This commission concludcd that industrial associations and social
services had to be intcgratcd regionally,  cooperating closely with public employmcnt agcncics. The
supervision by thc Social Insurance Council had to hecome fully independent of social partners and
thc authorities of the Council had to be cxtendcd. Not surprisingly, unions  and cmploycrs’
associations were vcry critical of this report. Then, in 1984, sevcntccn  ycars after the initial
1461  See Waldendorp (1995) lor a  survey of Dutch neocorporatism.
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rcqucs(  f()r advjq  thc  S()&l and  Economie  Council finally  dclivcred its advisory report. As Was
to be expected, thc  council arrivcd at thc conclusion that social partners were stil1 indispcnsahle in
implementing  and supcrvising social insurancc schcmcs.
Thc  government  now advocatcd a gradual rcvision of the organisational structurc of social
security. Thc cahinct acknowledged that this approach, with dut  to historically grown relations,
was needed as to ensurc  public support and to cmphasizc thc importante  of social consensus.
Furthermorc, pursuing  an intcgral reorganization of all cxecutivc organs simultaneously  might
cndanger  thc quality  of scrviccs. Thc first concrctc  step to a ncw organisational structurc was, in
1989, the mandatory request for advicc to thc Social and Economie  Council on a new Social
Sccurity Organization Act. This initiativc, which is discusscd in thc ncxt section,  was bcing
wclcomed hy thc Social and Economie  Council, though thc council did nat stop strcssing thc
importante  of industrial  insurance associations. Mcanwhilc, thc Social Insurance Council had
dccidcd to transfer all supervisory tasks  to a ncw Supervision Chamber, in which a (hare) majority
of seats  had been rescrved for independent mcmhcrs.
A step-by-step approach may seem as a solution to thc dcadlock in rencgotiating a new
organisational design.  However,  an incrcmental reorganization may have been inappropriate in
dcaling with the scope of problems  involved. Dutch labour relations dcccntralized further,
cspecially  as of 1982. Wage bargaining primarily took placc at industry and firm level.  No longcr
unions and employers pcrceived thc full costs  of social sccurity bcnefit claims, so that their wage
bargaining may entail  large adversc fiscal cxternalities.47 In line with this dcvelopment thc
significante  and legitimacy of advisory bodies such  as thc Social and Economie  Council had
crumbled.  Stressing the importante  of revitalizing neocorporatist institutions  seems  therefore not in
accordance with actual power relations in wage bargaining. Against this background it may not
have come  as a complete surprise that in 1993, after a critical report by the General Audit-Office
on the functioning of the Social Insurance Council, Parliament decided to insta11 a Parliamentary
Inquiry Commission as to investigate the organisational structure of social insurance.
This ‘Buurmcijer-Commission’ (after the namc  of its chairman) has been the first Parliamentary
Inquiry on social security in Dutch post-wat history.4x The main objective  of the Parliamcntary
Inquiry is to investigate both effectiveness and efficiency of the implcmentation of social insurance
programmes in the period 1980-1992. In addition, the Parliamentary  Inquiry Commission is
interested  in thc question whether an adequate monitoring and scrccning system exists as to
safeguard the development of the beneficiary  volume. In its final report, the Buurmeijer-Commis-
sion points out  three major problems  in current social security design.
First, despite complex administrative  procedures, intricate organisational structures, thc
implcmentation  of social insurance programmcs is equitable,  accurate and consistent. In this sensc,
social insurancc administration has been highly biased, as actual implemcntation is mcrely confined
to assessing and granting bencfits. The organisational structurc has failed to providc incentives as
to restrain  the volume of beneficiaries.  Hence, social insurance administration has becomc an
immense ‘benefits factory’, where matters of efficiency and effcctiveness play only a minor role.
Moreover, little  attention had been paid so far as to prcvcntion and reintegration as active
(471  Sec e.g. Kcuzenkamp e/ nl. (1993).
[48] Parliamenl  can decidc IO  collect  its  own information  hy mcans  of a Parliamcnlary  Inquiry. A Parliamentary  Inquiry
Commission has far-reaching powers,  as it can hear witnesses undcr oalh  and imprison witncsses who  refusc  to tcstil’y.
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stratcgics to rcducc thc number of bcncfit rccipients. Social insurancc administration has heen
widely dispcrscd,  and as a rcsult  of this bcncficiaries face many diffcrcnt  institutions which  may,
as a whole,  form an ohstaclc to activc  and rcintcgrative measurcs. Thc administcring hodics have
failcd to collaboratc,  and have not cvcn been intcrcsted in cach othcrs problcms.
Sccond,  thc division of rcsponsibilitics bctwccn thc govcrnment and social partners has been
indistinct. The intcrcsts  of cmploycrs and branch unions partly coincidc with thosc of industrial
insurancc associations. NO financial link cxists bctwcen private intercsts of social partners at thc
industry Icvcl on thc one hand and thc public interest on thc othcr, sincc social insurance
contribution ratcs  arc  idcntical throughout thc cconomy. Disability insurancc programmes have
been used by cmploycrs and branch unions as a gcncrous rcdundancy schcme  and a convenient
form of carly rctiremcnt. This ‘extcnsivc usc’ of disability schcmcs has been advantageous to
unions and cmploycrs as to circumvcnt firing Icgislation, .so as to avoid social conflicts and to
secure gcncrous and cnduring bcncfits. Utilizing thc WAO/AAW disability schcmcs for rcdundant
workers has been casy,  as cligibility thrcsholds have been low and spccifications and implementa-
tion loose.
Third, politica1 and administrative supervision has failcd. The Social Insurancc Council has
not been ablc to supcrvisc industrial associations cffcctivcly. The reason is that the svr consists of
thc same interest groups it is supposcd to supcrvisc, so that supcrvision has not been independent
of the ‘insiders’ in the labour markct.  This situation has been aggravatcd as social partners inclincd
to cooperatc in the Federation of Industrial Insurancc Associations. Although this fcdcration Jacks
public-law  status, it has gradually  gaincd considcrable cxercising power as it informally dcprivcd
the Svr  from its tasks. Not only the Social Insurancc Council  has failcd to supervise thc
organisational structure, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employmcnt and Parliamcnt have been
criticizcd for thcir passive and inert role, as both have more been intcrestcd in producing social
sccurity schemcs than in supervising and administcring these programmes. Cabinct and Parliament
have been vcry cautious to social partners as to prescrve social consensus, while it was in thc
interest of social partners to keep employce insurancc programmcs gencrous and accessible.4u
Only rccently, aftcr 1990, the government and social partners have bothered  to redrcss  thc  balance
Of active and passivc policy, so as to cut down the number of bcncficiaries.
In conclusion, the Parliamcntary Commission forccfully  shows that structural cconomic inactivity
and low labour participation are at least partially dut  to endogenous institutional elemcnts in thc
organisational structurc of social insurance. Gcncrous and lcnicnt social insurance programmes
easily absorb redundant workers, whilc providing fcw incentivcs as to re-entry the labour mark&.
The organisational structure has failcd to provide  the necessary checks and halanccs as to prcvent
that partial intercsts of tradc unions and employcrs prevail over the public interest, whercas
politica1 and administrative supcrvision bas failcd. The Buurmcijcr-report plays an important role
in future social policy,  as wil1 bc  dcmonstrated in the ncxt scction.
1491  This mipht  explain why govcrnment has awaited the advisory SER report on a new organisational  structure  for
seventeen ycars. It may  also  explain why both Parliament and the government  have tolerated the ‘extensive use’ of
disability schemes.  See Van den Heuvel (1994).
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$4.2  Reforming  social security  ndministrntion
As has already been pointcd bcforc, thc first step to a new organisational design is the
government’s initiativc for a new Social Security Organization Act. This bil1 provides  only a
transitional framcwork that solves th& most urgent problems  in thc prcvailing system, until a more
dcfinitivc organisational design has been dcvclopcd. A future organisational structure must be
organizcd rcgionally, as the  cahinct has adoptcd thc dcsirc of Parliamcnt as cxprcsscd in thc
‘Wiiltgens-rcsolution’.“” Thc Secretary of Statc  for Social Affairs and Employmcnt motivates the
transitional eharacter of thc act by pointing out  that social sccurity can only bc rcorganizcd fully
after thc politica1 dchatc on thc relation betwccn  govcrnmcnt and social partners has been crystal-
lizcd.
I
Thc ncw Soeial Seeurity Organization Act provides  scvcral ad.justmcnts  in thc top of thc
cxccutivc structurc. Most notahle  is the foundation of a national supcrvisory body and a national
coordinating body. The act therefore puts an end to the ambiguous charactcr of thc Social
Insurance Council, as it separates  its coordinating and supcrvisory tasks.  The industrial associ-
ations and the Social Security Institute arc  now to be supcrviscd by a fully independent  Supervis-
ory Board for Social Insurance (crsv),  whosc board consists of thrce indepcndcnt experts.
Further, most of thc coordinating, rcgulatory and advisory tasks of the formcr Social Insurance
Council are to be conccntrated in a Temporary Institute for Coordination and Tuning (TICA),
which can be regarded as a successor of the Fedcration of Industrial Associations. The board of
this institute  consists of social partners and an independent chairman. Onc  of its main tasks is 10
support and to coordinate the transition from a scctoral to a regional organisational structurc.
Industrial associations arc  obliged to put out  thcir administration to a designated administrative
office, so that managerial and administrative tasks are fully separated. Finally, industrial associ-
ations and thc PES have to collaborate  regionally, supported and coordinated by TICA.
As of January 1997, the new organisational structure has to bc  complctcd. In thc cabinet’s
view, al1 employee  insurancc schemes  will be implemented per rcgion. The regions wil1 coincide
with the twenty-eight existing districts  along which employment services have been organized. In
each rcgion one administrative body is responsible  for thc ‘integral case assessment’ (integrale
gevulshe!jandeZing) of social insurance beneficiaries. These regional officcs will thercforc rcplace
the current industrial  insurance associations. Regional administcring bodics have to operate  in close
cooperation with the PES, so as to enable  front office eollaboration (éérz loker, i.e., ‘onc-desk
approach’) or back office collaboration (één dossier,  i.e., working jointly  on the same administra-
tive file). These regional offices have to be eoordinated  by a national  administrative  body, the
future successor of TtcA.
$4.3  Retnnining  problenrs  nnd intended policy
The ncw Social Security Organization Act provides  only some transitional arrangcments, so that
the politica1 debate on a future organisational structure of social insurance programmes has not
[Sol  In the suhsequent  pnlitical  dcbale  on the Buurmeijer-report,  Parliamcnt has concluded lhat  supervision has 10  kome
fully independent  of social partners and social sccurity adminislration has 10  lx organizcd  rcpionally inslead  of scctorally,  in
close cooperation  with  the PES. These proposals  are usually  referred to as the ‘Wiillpcns-rcsolution’.
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been concluded. Yct, the coalition agrccmcnt  of thc currcnt govcrnmcnt undcr Prime Minister Kok
contains far-rcaching proposals  as to rcvisc thc orgnnisational  design of sickness and disahility
schcmcs. Thc Sickncss Bcncfits Acts has to be lnrgely privatizcd. Pnrlinmcnt has already conscntcd
to the govcrnmcnt’s proposals, and cmploycrs are now ohligcd to continuc to pay wngcs  for at
most fifty-two weeks  of sickncss spclls. With rcgard to disability insurancc, compctition and
diffcrcntiatcd premiums arc to bc  introduccd. As has alrcady been pointcd out  in thc previous
scction, thc govcrnment has adopted thc Woltgens-rcsolution  so that in future social insurancc
programmes wil1 hc  organizcd regionally instcad of scctorally. Furthcr, thc cabinct emphatically
favours an active role for social partners in a future organisational structure.“’
Thus, thc intentions of thc cahinct can bc summarizcd by four kcy words: (partial)
privatization, compctition, rcgionalization and subsidiarity.‘* This combinntion is sometimcs
referred to as ‘parallel privntization’, sincc cmployers wil1 bc frcc to choosc who  is to cover
sickncss and disability risks, industrial insurance associations or private insurance companics.
Compared to the current system, cmployers may decide to ‘opt out’  of public social insurance.
Parallel privatization thereforc rcfcrs  to a dual system of social sccurity in which risks can bc
covcred by either public authorities or dcsignated private insurancc companics. In thc cabinct’s
view the differentiation of social insurance contributions and thc lcgal provision to ‘opt out’  are
complemcntary measurcs, both aiming at ‘markct-likc’  discipline  in social insurance. Without
compctition by private  insurance companies, industrial associations have little interest in
reintegration and prcvcntion stratcgics. Only employers pcrceivc incentivcs as to restrain disability
spells. Conversely, opting out  without differcntiatcd contribution ratcs  is foolish, bccause
companies  would be indiffcrcnt to the question whether to opt out  or not.
The advantages of privatization are evident. Employers are confronted with the full budgetary
costs  of sickness and disability spclls, so that strong financial incentives emerge as to improve
working conditions and to foster other prcvention strategies. Since thc competition between private
and public insurers wil1 focus on premium rates, the assessment of bcnefit claims wil1 become
more strict. Average  contribution rates wil1 consequently fall.
Yet parallel privatization brings  along various difficulties.“’ As to cnsure the accessibility to
thc insurance market, minimum eligibility conditions have to be statcd so that adverse selection
problems are avoided. But, if private insurers are able  to pass large parts of disability costs  to
public funds, the insurance contracts  between insurers and insured invite ‘mora1 hazard’ behaviour
and unnecessary benefit  claims. It is in the interest of both the employee and thc employer to
conclude supplemcntary contracts, the former as to reducc the income losses dut  to work-related
risks, the Iatter as to be able to get rid of redundant workers. Thus, the supplementary insurancc
market may cause  considcrable adverse fiscal externalities.‘J
A prominent issue is whether cmploycrs wil1 incline to select werkers  on hcalth risks,
provided that thcsc  risks arc  obscrvablc. Employers may bc  induced to select applicants on hcalth
[51] Emphasizcd  oncc more by thc broad character of the request for advice  10  the Social  and Economie  Council on the
transition  to a territoria1 organisational  structure.
1.521  The intentions of the government follow  the line of arguments  of three  advisory reports:  of the Parliamentary Inquiry
Commission (sec seclion  3.1). the Scientific Council for Govcrnmcnt Policy (WRR (1994)) and the Social  and Economie
Council (19956).
]SZ]  See Bekkering (1994 and 1995). Van Praag (1995) and Petersen  (1994).
1.541  Van der Ploeg & Tculings  (1992 and 1993). See also section  3.3.
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Prisks. For instancc, if spccific occupational hcalth risks are corrclatcd to agc, cmployers in
industries with high hcalth risks may rulc out  oldcr workcrs, hcrcby Icaving largc groups of
individuals pcrmancntly outsidc the labour force and dcstroying considcrahlc amounts of human
capita].  From thc cmployers’ point of vicw, this may bc justificd as sickncss and disability
schemes do not distinguish bctwccn professional and social risks. In comhination with libcralized
cmploycc security Icgislation and flcxiblc  labour rclations, thc socinl  and cconomic sidc-cffccts of
thc cabinct’s proposals  may thcrcforc bc dctrimcntal, cspccinlly if onc  takes into account tightcncd
eligibility conditions and reduccd bcncfit gcncrosity.
In lint with this argument, companics may further scck to cmploy workcrs on a temporary
basis, so that the costs  of sickness and disability spclls arc rcconsigncd to public  social insurancc.
Thus, as an unintcndcd sidc-cffcct, parallel privatization may Icad to an cnormous incrcasc in thc
number of flexible labour contracts,  causing upward prcssurcs on thc social security budget
whencver sickncss and disability spclls occur. A rclated problcm is thc position of the chronically
sick and partially  disabled.  For those who  are already employed, privatization may have positive
effccts as thcir employcrs are stimulatcd to improvc working conditions. But, unemployed
outsiders might sce thcir job opportunities shrink even further, sincc employcrs are longer  able to
pass thc costs  to society at large. Thcreforc privatization may furthcr the vicieus  circlc of rcjcction
and stigmatization for pcrsons with health problcms.
Another problem of privatization is thc asscssmcnt of bcncfit claims. Thc ad.judication of
sickness spells is now carried out by private workings conditions companies. Alrcady now, as a
consequente  of the Working Conditions Act, employcrs have been obligcd to hire these companics
to reduce the incidence of sickness leave. In case  of conflict bctwecn the employer and thc worker,
industrial associations may providc a sccond  opinion. Onc  can wonder  whcthcr thc industrial
insurance associations are fully indcpcndent, as thcy are involvcd in both assessing claims and
granting benefits. To circumvent these problcms an indcpcndcnt institutc should bc  cstablishcd as
to assess  bcnefit claims.
Apart from these intrinsic difficultics of privatization, one may raisc the question to what cxtent
private and public insurers of work-related risks can coexist permancntly.“’ The transition to a
dual system of social security is hampered by a ma.jor differente  in thc financing modes of public
industrial insurance associations and private insurance companies.  Whercas industrial associations
equalize employec risks by a pay-as-you-go-system,  private disability insurance schcmes are
financed by a capita1 funding system. In the cabinct’s proposals, firms that decide to opt out do not
only have to pay contributions to the insurancc company hut pay-as-you-go  premiums for ‘old’
disability spclls  covered by public social insurance as well.  Thc pay-as-you-go  contribution rate
gradually declines as the stock of ‘old’ disability bcncficiaries declincs over time. According to
calculations by the Association of Insurers, it takes eight to twcnty-onc  ycars before it will be
profitable for employers to have disability risks insurcd by private insurers.“”
Thus, the stability of a dual system of disability insurance schemes can bc endangered for
two reasons. First, the competition by private  insurance companics may be incffcctive, since in the
initial years the capita1 funding system is more expensivc for firms. Sccond,  companics with a
[SS]  Already  now private insurance companies  cover disahility and sickness risks. since hranch  unions and employers have
repaircd previous bcnefìts  reductions through  collective  labour agreements.  Sce section  3.3.
156) SER (1995).
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bclow  average rjsk I~rofile  may dccidc  to lcavc thc  public disability schcmcs first. If this happens,
conlribution  rates  for  the rcmaining firms wil1 risc,  making cvcn more low-risk firms lcave the
puhlic scheme.  In both cases  thc  insurancc mnrkct  is unstnble and the  dual system  wil1 evcntually
lapsc. To safeguard thc  viability  of n dual system  of socinl sccurity, it is at least nccessary to have
industrial  insurancc associations  switch over to a capita1 funding system. Altcrnativcly,  private
disahility arrangcmcnts may hc  limited  to a fixcd number of ycars, aftcr  which disahlcd may apply
for puhlic follow-up bcncfits.  According to this scenario, thc diffcrcncc in financing modes raises
less obstaclcs  to viablc  competition bctwccn  private  and public insurcrs.
Thc cabinet’s intentions  nat only comprise of privatization  and compctition,  hut of rcgionalization
and subsidiarity  as wcll. Thc proposals on rcgionalization may causc  largc organisational problcms
if trade unions and employers are stil1 responsiblc for thc adminislration  and implementation  of
social insurancc programmes.
Regionalization  seems practicablc  as to organizc social security.  Already  now volume
policics contains  both sectoral and regional elcmcnts. Still,  a major obstacle  to these active polities
is that the organisational structure of social insurancc and employmcnt services do not yet corre-
spond.“’  So, it may seem appealing to have cmployment  agencies (which are organized
regionally) carry out  employec insurancc schcmes or to have regional offices implemcnt these
schemes  in close collaboration with thc  PES.“~ Such  an integral  or analogous administration of
social insurance programmes and manpowcr services facilitatcs  thc ‘onc-desk  approach’, herehy
fostering accessihility  for social insurance beneficiaries and promoting rcintegration.
With rcgard to thc  role of trade unions and cmployers, nat only do social partners finance
social insurance schemcs, thcir involvcment in wage bargaining affccts social security in many
ways. Trade unions and employers’ organizations may thereforc claim a joint rcsponsibility in the
organisational structure of social insurance. Involving these interest groups may further be
conducive to internalizing adverse externalities of wage bargaining. Though thc  disadvantagcs  of
industry-leve1 bargaining and intermediate degrees of corporatism may apply to the organisational
structure of social security, differentiating social sccurity contributions  may yield streng  and
sufficient  incentives for employers and trade unions to take into account the full costs  of bcnefit
claims. Moreover, succcssive rctrenchmcnts  have reinforced the importante  of sectoral wage
bargaining, since branch unions and employers have reintroduced benefit  cuts through collective
agreemcnts. Differcntiating insurance contributions  and privatizing disability schcmes may
therefore be complementary measurcs to the joint responsibility  of govcrnmcnt, trade unions  and
employers’ organizations.
However,  the transition from a sectoral to a regional organisational structure may be at least
partly  incompatible with the involvcment of trade unions and employers.“’  The beneficial effects
of differcntiating premiums might bc  cancclled out, if regional instead of sectoral bodics take over
the administration of social insurance schcmcs. Scctoral expertise on work-related  risks and
working conditions, brought in by branch unions and employers, can get lost in a territoria1
1.57 Enquêtecommissie Uitvoering Sociale Verzekeringen (1993).
1-581  A S  a n  alternative  fo a regional  organisational  strucfure,  municipal  authorities  ( w h i c h  already  now  administer  social
aSSk.tanCe  programmes) may  take over the implementation  of sucial insurance programmes.  i&cal  authorilies  are equipped
(0 Promote  labour  participalion and 10  asscss  benefíts  claims. Already  now, a comprehcnsive policy  as 11)  assist  recipienls of
welfare  Provisions  is carried  out,  whereas puhlic employment agencies are nat yet functioning  weI1 (sce  chapter  5).
1591  CL  SER (1994n).  See  also  t h e  explanalory  memorandum to the  new bil1 on  the  PIS..
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organisational structurc. Conversely, prevcntion and reintegration as widcly recognizcd labour
markct  instrumcnts may  have more succcss if social insurancc programmes are both organized and
implcmented per  industrial sector  or occupational group. Furthcr, whereas now the hehaviour of
hranch  unions  and employcrs may  stil1 hc  monitorcd and even coordinated at thc national  level,  it
is doubtful  whcthcr these  actors wil1  Iet  thc pubiic  intcrcst  prcvail over thcir private  intcrcsts  in the
ncw tcrritorial organisational structurc. Though sectoral  wage  bargaining within rcgions may  stil1
bc  conducive to intcrnalizing advcrsc wage  cxtcrnalitics, thc fiscal  intcrnalisation cffccts may  be
less strong than within currcnt wage  bargaining. Thus, thc transition to a  territoria1 structurc may
hampcr the effcctivity of volume polities,  if social partners  continue to play  a  dominant role in
administcring social insurancc. Considcring thc wish of Parliamcnt to adept  a  rcgional
organisational structurc, it may  thcrcforc bc  dcsirablc to curtail  thc administrative  powcrs of
unions  and employcrs.
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Chpter  5 Third approach: Renewing active labour market policy
Reintegrating and rc-cmploying bcncficiarics into thc labour force  has now been acknowlcdged as
an explicit  function of social insurancc, in addition to thc morc  traditional safety net and wage
rcplaccment functions. This is a result of thc report by thc Parliamcntary Inquiry Commission and
advisory reports of the Scientific Council for Govcrnmcnt Policy and thc Social and Economie
Council.“’ Effectivc rcintcgration rcquircs that hcncfit awarding agcncics and puhlic employmcnt
agencies do collaborate.  Puhlic cmploymcnt agencics have oftcn been criticized for lacking the
institutional potency to anticipate  to labour market dynamics. Only rccently, in 1991,  the PES was
rcorganized drastically, towards a tripartitc, deccntralizcd and dcmonopolized organisational
structure. Section S.l briefly surveys the dcvelopmcnt of thc new Public Employmcnt Service Act.
Scction 5.2 evaluates the reorganizcd PES and discusses  collaboration projects bctwecn the PES and
benefit-awarding agencies. Section 5.3 reviews the governmcnt’s intcntions on thc PES.
$5.1 A new lripartile  hrblic  Employmenl  Service
The purpose of thc Public Employment Service is threefold.“’ Rcgular cmployment policy aims at
enhancing thc efficiency of the matching proccss of labour dcmand and labour supply, so that a
given number of job seekcrs is associated with fcwer vacanties.  Target group policy directs at
improving the labour market situation of spccific groups and individuals who  have few job
opportunities. Cyclical employment policy aims at clearing the labour market by reducing cxcesses
of supply and demand.  Scveral instruments are availablc, such as labour market information,
vocational guidance and counselling, regular employment exchange and placement services,
schooling and training programmes, wage subsidies and subsidiscd employment.
Until recently, the PES has been an cxclusive governmcnt responsibility, controlled  by the
Directorate-Genera1 for Public Employment Service of thc Ministry of Social Affairs and Employ-
ment, and implemented by regional job offices.  When new PES Act camc effcctive on January 1st
1991, this situation came to an end. The development of this act is a long history of bargaining,
negotiating and compromising.“’ As early as in 1980, the government had asked the Social and
Economie  Council for advice on a Public Employment Service Act. Thc necd for legislation on
PES  was motivated by the lack of a coherent and legal set of instruments. Apart from this technical
reason, the PES  had to be reorganized as to solve some urgent social problcms. For one thing,  the
programme of employment mcasures had become highly fragmcnted. Thc establishment of an
autonomous PES plays a crucial role in promoting coherencc in active labour market policy.
Further, because of massive unemployment, Parliamcnt tcndcd to spcnd largc sums of money on
labour market programmes. By integrating these programmes it may become possible to monitor
the quality and the effectiveness of employment measures, so that budgetary control could be
160) Enquêtecommissie Uitvoering Sociale Verzekeringen (1993). WRR (1987 and 1990)  and SER (1990).
1611  Aarts & De Jong ( 1994). C/I Boot (1994).
[62] Sce Tor an excellent overview Van Gestel (1994).
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improvcd. Nat only a cohcrcnt  and consistent policy framework was to hc  designed for  cmploy-
ment policy,  very littlc  efforts had heen put so far in coordinating and intcgrating  public employ-
ment agencies, industrial insurancc associations and organizations relatcd to public hcalth and
working conditions.“’ Morcovcr, ncw lcgislation ennbled centra1 govcrnment to supcrvisc and
rcgulate local and regional initiativcs by municipal authorities and private interest groups. NO
wonder that thc government was scvercly criticizcd hcfore, not in the  least placc hy union
federations and employers’ associations.
In the initial request for advicc, the PES is stil1 considercd as an cxclusive responsibility of
thc government, in spitc of thc politica1 and social tendency to diminishing involvcments of centra1
governmcnt. Thc final advisory report of the Social and Economie  Council, issued in 1985,
substantially deviates  from thc initial proposals of thc government. In its report, the Social and
Economie  Council concludes that the PES has to bccome the joint rcsponsibility of tradc  unions,
employers’ organizations and the government, as to promotc social consensus on employment
measures. Undcr this centra1 board operate rcgional boards as to anticipate  to regional labour
market dynamics. The forma1 government’s monopoly on placcment services  has to bc  abolished,
so that liccnsed private employment agencies can be initiated. With regard to social security, the
Social and Economie  Council concludes that the authorities of the public employment agcncies and
the industrial associations have to be demarcated clcarly. Thus cooperation betwecn exccutive
bodies that are involvcd in either employment measures or social insurance is ruled out.
,
,
The coalition government under Prime Minister Lubbers largely agrees with the advisory report of
the Social and Economie  Council, and now an interdepartmental project team has been established
as to prepare a bil1 on the employmcnt service. Though initially Parliament is very critical of this
bill, it eventually passes the PES Act in 1989. The new PES Act serves three ob.jectives,  in line with
the advisory report of the Social and Economie  Council: tripartite management, decentralization
and demonopolization. An independent statutory body has been established, the new Public
Employment Service. This organization is governed by a Centra1 Board of Public Employment
Service (CBA). In the CBA  tradc unions, employers and centra1 government are equally represented.
Under the ccntral board twenty-eight Rcgional Boards (RBA) operate,  which are comprised of
regional representatives  of trade unions, employers’ organizations, municipal and provincial
authorities. Up to a certain extent these RBAS are autonomous  in carrying out  their own policy. If
licensed by the CBA,  temporary work agencies and private counselling agencies are permitted.
Decentralization and demonopolization seem both logica1 strategies  towards a market
oriented approach of the PES. The obvious advantage of territoria1 decentralization is that a
regionally oriented executive  structure enables the PES to anticipate  to regional labour market
conditions. Decentralization therefore contributes  to reducing mismatches in regional labour
markets. Decentralization further anticipates  to fully  decentralizcd labour relations, alrcady
initiated in the 1982 ‘Wassenaar-agreement’.* Though previously the government had not
allowed private employment exchange agencies as to avoid exploitation and preferential trcatment
of job-seekers, the introduction of a licence system is a first step to a complcmcntary rolc of the
PES. The PES thus offers services, such  as labour market information and placement services,
[63] For instance, a small-scale  experiment of eight  Regional  Coordinalion Commissions (RK), initialcd  in 1980  and aimed
al encouraging local and regional contacts  and coopration, bas  failed.
1641  See Van de Wjngaert  (1994).
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which are not providcd by othcr private agencies. This implics that thc PES will not serve thc
labour markct  at Iargc,  hut conccntrates on spccific groups and individuals with a poor prospect of
finding a suitahlc job.‘“’ Apart from providing public scrviccs, thc PES has to coordinate private
intcrmediarics as wel].
Thc far most important innovation is the introduction of tripartitc managcmcnt, in hoth thc
CBA and the RBAS. A tripartitc PES has scvcral potcntial advantagcs for al1 partics involved.“” For
onc  thing, including social partners in thc PES is conducivc to rcaching a social consensus tackling
uncmploymcnt and cconomic  inactivity. Whereas previous efforts of govcrnment have somctimes
been thwarted hy social partners, in a tripartitc organisational structurc tradc  unions and employcrs
are at least passively rcsponsiblc to cmploymcnt mcasures. Morcover, social partners may be
inclincd to intensify their own placcment services and to intcrnalizc advcrsc wage  extcrnalities.
Social partners have often  criticized thc government for lacking thc institutional potency to
anticipate  adcquately and flexibly  to labour market dynamics. From thc govcrnmcnt’s point of
vicw,  involving social partners in the PES plcasantly  incorporatcs thcir continuing criticism.“’
Conversely,  for both union fcderations and employers’ associations thc unsatisfactorily functioning
of the PES is a primary motive to participatc in a tripartitc organisational structurc. In addition,
employers welcome their potential influcnce on job offices and hope to gain influence on
vocational education. For trade unions, participating in thc PES emphasizes their attachmcnt to
employment measures.
Eis.2 Evaharing  the reorganìzed hrhlìc  Enpioynmt  Service
In 1994 the PES Act has officially been evaluated.“’ The Evaluation Commission Public Employ-
ment Service Act, in short thc ‘Van Dijk-Commission’ after thc name of its chairman, has
investigated the labour market results of thc new PES in the period 1991-1994 and thc cxtent to
which these results can be attributed to the dcmonopolized, deccntralized and tripartite
organisational structurc of the PW. Despite the innovative character of the act, thc evaluation
commission severely criticizes the functioning of the new PES.
The new PES  has adopted the ‘slipstream mechanism’. According to this mechanism,  employ-
ment agencies primarily concentrate their efforts at clients who are likely to benefit  from their
support, rather  than to focus on persons with labour market problems. By its market share and its
contacts  with employers, the PES hopes to serve the interests of ‘hard-to-placc’ clicnts as wcll.“”
The PES  thercfore considers the number of successful placements as thc primary output indicator.
Tablc 5.1 provides  some fìgures on the number of direct placements, i.e., successful matches
bctween registered job-seckers and registered vacanties,  which can be attributed to the direct
[65] See seclion  5.3.
[(ifi] See Van Gestel (1994) and REA (1995).
1671  From a hislorical  perspective,  a tripartite  and relatively  centralizzd  PES  is atlraclive  to the Ministry of Social  Affairs
and Employment, as IO  exclude the ambitions of the Ministry of Economie  Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs. See
Van Gestel (1994).
1681  See Commissie Evaluatie Arbeidsvoorzicningswet (199.5). Two preliminary investigations  have been  published
separalely  as REA (1995) and De Koning et nl. (1995). See also Ernste  (1995) and De Koning (1995).
(691 See e.g. OECD (1990), Dercksen (1994).
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Tnhle 5.2  Direct placements” by the PEs’in  1988-1994
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Numhers  (x 1000 persons) 11dex  Jïgwcs  (1 %W=lOO)
PESh HFR’ CBS/HJSS” PESh HFR’ CBS/HJSS”
123 87 39 100 100 100
131 81 28 107 93 72
128 77 36 104 x9 92
129 64 28 106 74 72
147 81 41 120 92 1 os
147 83 54 120 96 138
173 85 41 141 98 1 os
’ The number of successful matches between  registered  joh-seekers  end regislered vacanties,  which can be  conlribulcd
direclly la the efforls made by the PES. Note thal job-seekers may overcslimale  lheir own efforls and undereslimale the
efforls by lhe PES, so lhal  the IIJSS  surveys cannol be  compared dircclly 10  lhe Cns stalislics.
’ Sorrrre:  PES, revised for one RRA
’ Som-e: How do firnrs  recnrit?, measured as the marke1  share of lhe PES limes lhe total number of vacanties
’ Sowce: Central  Bureau of Stalislics  (up to and including  1991),  HOM* do joheekers  senrch?  (as of 1992).
Sortrce:  De Koning e/ nl. (1995). lable  3.3.
mediation efforts of the PES.” From inspection of tahle 5.1, it emcrges that the tripartite PES has
pcrformed very well,  despite the decline of vacanties  as of 1990. Thc successivc incrcases in the
number of successful placcments have caused the markct share of the PES to improve considerahly.
This tcndency is also illustratcd by table 5.2. Table  5.2 surveys market penetration rates and
market shares of the PES in several Europcan countries. Market pcnetration rates  and markct shares
are dcfined as thc proportion of notifïed  vacanties  or successful placemcnts in all hirings, thercby
considering hirings as a proxy of thc flow of vacanties  in the economy. In the period of 1991 to
1994, the market share of the Dutch PES has doubled, though the market penctration rate has been
relatively stablc. However,  the growth of the market share is primarily due to increased unemploy-
ment. In recessions less people change jobs, so that the share of unemployed in total job-stekers
increases and the market share of the PES tends to rise. From inspcction of table 5.2, it emerges
that the quantitative output of the Dutch PES is stil1 modest compared to other European coun-
tries.”
A more sophisticated method to evaluate  the performance of the Employmcnt Service is to
measure the impact of the PES on labour market efficiency. For this purpose, the Van Dijk-
commission has compared matching-functions in different RBA regions. From this analysis  no
indications can be derived as to conclude that the PES has fostercd the efficiency of the matching
process significantly. Still,  the equity in the labour market may have improved somewhat, though
it is not clear to what extent the PES can bc  credited for this. Dcspite thc disproportionatc inflow of
women and ethnic minoritics into the labour force, the proportion of unemployed among thcsc
170)  Thus, excluding  the indirect effects  of labour marke1  inslrumenls such as schooling  and lraining programmes. Nole lhaf
lhe number of placemenls does nol  reflecl  lhe mediation efforls made by lhe PES  very  well,  since nol every  plating has the
same value.  Moreover. serious doubts  can be raised as IO  lhe reliabilily and comparabilily of placemenl figures. See De
Koning er nl.  (1995).
[71] The low markel  share of lhe Dutch FES  may  be due lo lhc dominant rolc  of privalc  temporary  work agencies in lhe
Netherlands.
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Tahle  5.2 Market penetration rates  and market shares of the PES in several countries
Counlry
Ncthcrlands’
Ycar Marker  pene~sdon”
1990 21%
1991J 20%
1992 18%
1993 20%
1994 22%
Mark&  shareh
9 %
8 %
10%
14%
16%
Austria
Dcnmark
Gcrmany
Norway
Spain
Swcden
Switzerland
Unitcd Kingdom
1991
1989/1991
1990
1988
1989
1988
1991
1988
9-32% 3-10%
14-21% lO-15%
33% 22%
9- 55% + 11%
23% S%
27% 20%
2 90% 22-43%
-+  50% k 30%
’ Vacanties  registered hy the PES  as a percentage of all  hirings
h Placemenls  by the PES  as a percentage of al1  hirings
’ Based on the IIFR surveys (see table  5.1).
” The tripartile  orpanisational  strudure  of the Dutch  PES  has come  into efrect  as of 1991.
Note:  Wet-country  comparison is severely hampered hy differences in nalional  definitions  and measurement methods.
Sortrces:  Norway, Spain  and the UK: OECD (19936). tables  5 and 6; Netherlands: Ifow  dofims  recrrtit.  revised by
Nederlands Economisch Instituut; all  ether  countries: Auslrian  BlrrtdesrtrinisrerirrnrIiir  Arbeid nrrd.h-des.
See De Koning et nl. (1995). tables  3.4 and 8.7.
target groups has not increased. Labour market prospects of ethnic minorities, oldcr and long-term
uncmployed have improved slightly,  compared to the average unemployed.  Although therc is some
empirical evidente  that these disadvantaged groups may have benefited hy the increased market
share of the PES and the intensified contacts  with employers, other factors  are of greater import-
ante  to their labour market position.
The evaluation commission judges that the new PES  has focused too much  at serving the
labour market at large. So far, the PES has defined target groups very broadly. Eighty-fivc per cent
of all registered unemployed falls within one or morc  of the target groups. In thc view of the Van
Dijk-Commission, the Public Employment Service should concentrate its efforts primarily on
disadvantaged groups instead of attempting to cover as large a part of the labour market as
possible. In this sense, the Van Dijk-commission favours a complcmentary role for the PES to
private employment agencies. Private employment agencies can provide  most of its current
services, especially  for persons  whose gcneral labour market prospccts are relativcly good.
Though the evaluation commission does not re.ject the tripartite character of the PES as such,  it
concludes that the new organisational structure has not performed very satisfactorily, especially on
the national lcve1.72 Similar to the findings of the Parliamcntary Inquiry on social insurance, the
Van Dijk-Commission finds that private interests of social partners often prevail  over the public
interest. In the CBA,  social partners have primarily  represented their own intcrests and have not
[ 721  See also REA (1995) and Ernste  (1995).
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been focused at reaching social consensus.  This situation has been aggravatcd by the asymrnctrical
rclation hctwccn  govcrnmcnt and social partners, becausc  ccntral govcrnment has played four
rolcs: as legislator, financier, administrator and supervisor.
Still,  regional boards have functioncd rcasonablc. Here,  thc thrcc partics have been more or
less cquivalcnt. Rcprescntatives of tradc  unions and employcrs have opcratcd morc  indcpcndcnt
than their counterparts in the CBA.  Deccntralization and tripartite managcmcnt have Icd thc PES to
anticipate  flcxihly and timcly to local and rcgional labour markct  conditions, in accordancc with
initial expcctations. Though the cxpcctcd conjunction of cmplaymcnt  mcasurcs and collcctivc
agrecmcnts is not yct a widcspread phenomcnon, thc numhcr of scctoral covcnants on training pro-
grammes and work cxpcricncc arrangcmcnts has incrcascd substantially. With regard to the
abolition of the govcrnment’s monopoly on placement services, the liccnsc system has not yct
functioned very well,  and RBAS have choscn to competc with private intermcdiaries (with rcference
to the slipstream mcchanism). Due to a Iack of central authority, large differences exist betwcen
regions, so that the cohcrence and transparcncy in employment mcasures have not improved so
far.
The Van Dijk-Commission points out  that many forms of collaboration exist bctwecn employment
services, local authorities, industrial insurancc assoeiations and othcr exccutive bodies. The
intercsts of thc PES, social services  and industrial associations partly coincidc, bccause these
organizations often serve the same clients. From a macroeconomic pcrspective, collaboration is
therefore an important strategy to reduce  the numbcr of bencfit recipients, so as to safeguard the
viability of the system of social security. So far, collaboration projccts have not yet been crystal-
lized, not in the least place as a result  of the considcrable differences in the organisational
structure of social insurance programmes, welfare assistance and the PES. Although local
authorities and employment offices often cooperate, these forms of collaboration are generally
without engagement, despite the participation of municipal  authorities in the RBAS.”  Collaboration
between the PES  and industrial associations is less common. Although these forms of collaboration
have not been evaluated broadly yet, a recent  survey shows that large intra- and interregional
differences exist .74
Two main approaches of collaboration can be distinguished. First, collaboration can be
aimed at.disadvantaged  groups or individuals with labour market problems.  According to this
target group approach, the primary objective  is to promote re-entry into the labour force, for
reasons of equity and volume control.  For instance, the PES and social service may jointly provide
intensive job-search assistance services, e.g. for long-term unemployed and persons  with
disabilities. Other examples of this approach are Youth Work Guarantee Plans and Labour Pools.
Second, collaboration projects also may aim at improving efficiency and cffectivcness of participat-
ing bodies. Well-known examples are joint front offices and joint administrative files. Within these
target group-oriented and proces+orientcd  approaches a further distinction can be made bctwcen
autonomous and intcgrated collaboration.”
[73] See also Boorsma et n/.  (1994). Note that as of 1987, many  farms  of collaboration  between  social services and the PW
have been initiated  as a consequente  of the ‘rcorientation interviews’ policy. See Bouman (1992).
[74] Esser e/ nl. (1995).
17-51  Besidcs these two  main  approaches, policy and information  collaboration  can be  distinguished,  aimed at either
developing collaboration  projects  or exchanging information.
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Whercas thc  PES  of 1991, aiming  at an efficicnt and cquitablc  matching hetwcen hIbour  demand
and labour supp]y,  has initially  been set up as to influcncc thc cntire labour market allocation,  thc
report of the Van Di.jk-Commission clearly  shows that the functioning of thc PES falk  short Of  its
initial cxpectations and its amhitious purposcs. Thc currcnt Minister  of Social Affairs and
Employment Mclkcrt has rcacted  quickly to this critical cvaluation report and has rcccntly  draftcd
a ncw bil] on thc PES.
In lint with the  Van Dijk-report, thc govcrnmcnt acknowlcdgcs  that thc PES has to conccn-
trate its efforts primarily  at hard-to-placc individuals instcad of serving thc labour market at large.
In thc proposed new organisational structure of thc PES, scveral ambiguous rcsponsibilities have
been rcmoved. Thc dcmarcation of managcrial and supervisory tasks have been improved. Thc
most important element of the bil1 is that centra1 governmcnt wil1 no longcr takc  part in the
Central Board. This makes an end to thc situation that the governmcnt has both supervisory and
managcrial tasks in the CBA.  Supcrvision and budgctary control by the govcrnmcnt is to hc
improved. Representatives of trade unions and employers in thc CBA  have to meet additiona]
requirements as to ensure their independente.  Further, in future private employment agencies can
operate without a liccnce, so that the PES no longcr has both exccutive and supervisory tasks.
Already  now, industrial associations and thc PES  are obliged to cooperate, as a consequente
of the new Social Security Organization Act. In line with the reviscd National Assistance Act
municipal authorities have to collaborate  with the PES as wcll. These obligations  have heen
included in the new PE.S  bil1 as well.  Once these forms of collaboration are carried out  systemati-
cally,  for the time being coordinatcd by TICA, the intcgral case asscssmcnt of social sccurity
beneficiaries wil1 be facilitated considerably.  Benefit-awarding agcncies and employmcnt  services
have to maintain their independente  and administrative authority. Thc government thercfore
faveurs process oriented collaboration as to pursue an integral case assessment of social security
bencficiaries. In behalf of assistance to disadvantaged clicnts, industrial councils and municipal
authorities may purchase placement  and schooling facilities  from either public employmcnt officcs
or private employment agencies. This potentiality  of competition may foster ‘market-like’
discipline for the PES.
Systematic  collaboration between benefit-awarding agencies and employment agencies is conducive
to cffective ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ polities.  Sanctions may be used as to increase the financial
prcssure on social security beneficiaries who  either declinc re-employmcnt programmes or fail to
meet legal requirements of availability  and willingness-to-work. For an effcctive sanction policy, it
is necessary that sanctions are implemented adequately and have the dcsired behaviourial effects.
With regard to the former condition,  previous expcriences of industrial councils show that large
differences may arise in imposing sanctions, mainly due to branch-specific  factors.”  Recently
new stringent guidelincs have been issued as to coordinate sanction polities  for uncmploymcnt
assistance arrangements. At implementation  stage stil1 large diffcrences exist in applying  these
rcgulations, even though these guidelines are wel]-defined and prccisc.”
[76] In ‘I Groen & Koehler  (1993).
[ 77j  Ministry of Social Affairs and Employmcnt  (199%).
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As of the 1987 system reform, sanctions arc imposcd morc  frcqucntly. Yct, it is not clcar  to
what cxtent sanctions affect  job-scarch cfforts by bencfit rccipicnts. Mcasuring thc effccts of
sanctions is very  hard dut to samplc  sclcctivity hiascs. From thc fcw studies  that have heen
conducted so far, sanctions sccm to fostcr rc-entry  chanccs of uncmploymcnt bcncficiaries, hut not
of recipients of social  assistance or  uncmploymcnt assistance.” Onc  nccds to he  vcry cautious on
inferring that sanctions therefore not always  have  thc desircd bchaviourial  effects,  sincc not all
diffcrcnces bctwecn ccnsured and non-ccnsurcd hencfit rccipicnts can  bc  monitorcd. Further, apart
from thc question to what extcnt sanction affect the bchaviour of bcncficiarics, thc implcmcntation
of sanctions may  fail,  as has been pointcd out  bcforc. Hcncc, morc  stringent and systcmatic
polities  on sanctions may  stil1 be  rcquircd to rcdrcss  thc balancc bctwcen activc  and passive
polities,  and comprchcnsivc collaboration  bctwecn thc cmploymcnt scrvicc, municipal  authoritics
and industrial insurance councils scems esscntial to such policics.
1781  Sec. reveclively,  Ahhring el nl. (1995). Ministry of Social  Affairs ml  Employment  (19951~) and Angenent  CI nl.
(1993).
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Chpter 6 Conclusions
Thc security system has not been dcsigncd to copc with thc currcnt scalc  and structural nature of
economie  inactivity it currcntly faces. Yct, thc problcms of the Dutch social security system have
been widely ignored for a very long timc. Thc Parliamcntary Inquiry Commission on social
insurancc pin-points thc principal  causc  of currcnt problcms: tradc  unions and employcrs’
organizations have been involved in hoth developing, executing and supcrvising social insurance
programmes. Thus, already in thc foundations of contemporary social insurance programmes a
potentially untenable  and unworkable compromisc has been set up between government and these
so-called social partners.“’ Over the past decades, Dutch labour rclations  have decentralized
considerably. Wage bargaining is now primarily  concentratcd at industry and firm Icvel. Thc
organisational structure of social insurance programmes has not been revised analogously. In line
with this discrepancy, one can obscrve that unions and cmploycrs frcquently have Iet their private
intcrests prevail over thc public interest.
Government and Parliament  have operated very cautiously to social partners as to prcserve
social consensus. Dcspite evident signals that the future viability of social insurancc schcmes may
be endangered, both government and Parliament have hesitated for a long time to undertake drastic
policy changes. Not until recently, and only after sevcral evaluation commissions have invcstigated
and severely criticized (the implementation of) (parts of) thc system of social security, scrious
efforts have been made as to reform social insurance programmcs.
Thc first politica1 steps to deal with thc economie  inactivity and the high costs  of social security
have been policy measures as to enhance the coherente  within thc network of different social
insurance programmes, without affecting the fundamental and institutional characteristics of the
system itself. This is the ultimate  ineffectivencss of the ‘1987 system reform’ in short. The vast
volume of beneficiaries has not been curhed until successivc policy measurcs as of 1992.
Meanwhile, the politica1 focus has shiftcd to thc role of social partners in administrating and
implementing social insurance programmes. The Parliamentary  Inquiry of 1993 forcefully shows
that the organisational  structure has failed to provide sufficient inccntives to these interest groups
as to restrain the volume of heneficiaries. The suhsequent dehatc on the new Social Security
Organization Act beneficially fostcrs the economy policy debate on the foundations of social
insurance. Instead of only absorbing redundant workers, social insurance programmes have to be
organized as to reintegratc beneficiaries into the labour market. So, it is now been perceived that
rcintegration is a distinct and reciprocal purpose of social security.
In its coalition  agreement, the current cabinet undcr Prime Minister Kok has proclaimed that 1996
will be the year in which social security is to be examincd again, so as to decide whether further
reforms are necessary. Yet, the cabinct has high expcctations of the policy measures that have
recently been adopted or are to be implcmented in thc near future. The cabinct’s intentions can bc
1791  Note  lhat  whereas lhe Dutch parliamentary system providcs conslilulional  guarantees  as 10  separate powers, no
comparable arrangements  have been devised Cor  lhe collaboralion  betwcen  governmcnl and social partners.
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summarizcd by four key words: privatization, compctition, rcgionalization and subsidiarity. These
proposals may he criticizcd for threc  rcasons: thc continuing involvemcnt of trade unions and
employers, the economie  and social sidc-cffccts of privatizntion, and thc  viability and stahility of a
dual system of social security.
It  secms  curieus  that thc govcrnmcnt stil1 bothcrs to share its rcsponsibilities, considcring prcvious
cxpcrienccs on thc involvcmcnt of social partners in thc administcring social insurancc pro-
grammes and employmcnt scrviccs. Yct, partial privatization of social insurancc may yicld
sufficient incentives as to prcvcnt ahusc  of social insurancc schcmcs, sincc employcrs and branch
unions will bc  confrontcd with the budgctnry costs  of sickncss and disability spells. Thcrcfore, thc
proposals on partial privatization and continuing involvcmcnt of social partners  may bc rcinforc-
ing. Still,  thc transition to a rcgional organisational structurc  may diminish thcsc  beneficial cffects
of industry-leve1 and firm-lcvel incentives. Taking into account thc wish of Parliament to adopt a
regional organisational structure, one may thcrefore wonder whcther the administrativc powers of
social partners do not have to be reduced. Curtailing the role of unions and employers’ associ-
ations in defining social policy may furthcr be bcneficial to the dcmocratic  Icgitimacy of govern-
ment  policy.“’
With rcgard to thc  ‘parallel privatization’ of disability schcmcs, thc advantages of
privatization may be overshadowed by thc advcrsc ex arrle selcction of workcrs with hcalth
problems, Icaving great numbers of cmployees pcrmancntly outsidc thc labour force. Privatization
may therefore be at odds with reintcgration policics. Further, private  and public  social insurance
schemes  may only coexist if insurers  opcrate on equal terms. So as to safeguard thc viability of a
dual system of social security, it seems sensiblc  to either  smooth the financing modes of private
and public insurers or to restrict compctition to thc first years of disability and sickncss spclls.
Rethinking the design of social insurance programmes furthcr involves thc nced to anticipatc to
tendenties  towards flexible  and deccntralized labour relations and thc proportional incrcase of thc
ageing population. Social insurancc programmcs also may be rcvised as part of thc future
harmonization of national social security systems  within the European Union.
[NI]  Consigning public  responsihilities  to ‘social partners’  does nat relieve the commitment  10  goed  govcrnmcnt. For  this
reason, il may  lx  useful to recall that  diminishing involvements of central  governmcnt do nol aulomatically  rcsult in
reducing steering necds (Advisory Vonhoff-Commission (1981)).
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List of abbreviations
AAW
ABW
AKW
AOW
AWBZ
A W W
IOAW
IOAZ
nosv
RWW
T w
WAO
w s w
nWW
WWV
Z F W
zw
CBA
Cl-SV
c o s z
PERS
RBA
S E R
SVB
SVR
TICA
WRR
Socinl Secwi(y  ACLT
Gcneral Disahlcmcnt Bencfits Act
National Assistance Act
Gcncral Family Allowanccs Act
Genera1 Old Age Pensions Act
Genera1 Act on Exccptional Mcdical Expcnscs
Gencral Widows’ and Orphans’ Pensions Act
Act on Incomc Provisions for Oldcr or Partially Disahled,  Uncmploycd Pcrsons
Act on Incomc  Provisions for Oldcr or Partially Disahlcd,  Formcr Self-Employcd  Pcrsons
(New) Social Security Organization Act
Unemploymcnt Assistance Arrangement
Supplemcntary Benefits Act
Disablcment Bcnefits Act
Sheltered Employment Act
(New) Unemployment Benefits Act
Unemployment Provision Act
Health Insurance Act
Sickness Benefits Act
Centra1 Board of Puhlic Employment Service (PES)
Supervisory Board for Social Insurance
Social Security Research Committee
Project Evaluation of the Rcvised System of Social Sccurity
Regicnal  Board of Puhlic Employment Service (PES)
Social and Economie  Council
Social Security Institute
Social Insurance Council
Temporary Institute for Coordination and Tuning
Scientific Council for Govcrnment Policy
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